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Abstract 
This chapter first discusses what economists mean by "the incidence of agricultural 
policy" and why we care about it. Then it reviews models of the determinants of the 
differential incidence of different policies among interest groups such as suppliers 
of factors of production, consumers, middlemen, taxpayers, and others. Results are 
represented in terms of Marshaltian economic surplus, and surplus transformation 
curves. After reviewing the results from standard models under estrictive assumptions, 
certain assumptions are relaxed in order to analyze the effects of imperfect supply 
controls, variability, cheating and imperfect enforcement of policies, and the dynamics 
of supply. 
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1. Introduction 
Why study policy incidence? One reason is that the economic welfare effects of policies 
are intrinsically interesting. In addition, the distribution of the resulting benefits and 
costs is central to understanding why particular policies are chosen; and it is also useful, 
in some settings, for prescribing policies. Whether we are interested primarily in the 
causes or in the consequences of policies, it is often appropriate to go beyond the most 
aggregative summary measures reported in some studies, such as Harberger triangles of 
deadweight loss, to consider the welfare effects on particular groups in society. 
In the analysis of agricultural commodity policies, for instance, it is common to 
distinguish between the effects on welfare of agricultural producers and the effects on 
other economic agents. The economic effects of policies are then represented in terms 
of the costs and benefits to producers as a group and to other groups in society (i.e., the 
distributional effects), and the net effects on society as a whole (the sum of the effects 
on producers and others), when we talk about he incidence of agricultural policy, then, 
we usually mean the distribution f the costs and benefits of the policy among different 
interest groups, defined in terms of their roles as consumers, taxpayers, or producers (or 
suppliers of factors of production). 
It is conventional in commodity policy analysis to use Marshallian consumer surplus 
as a measure of consumer welfare change, as an approximation f the more theoretically 
correct Hicksian welfare measures, implicitly presuming the bias is small, based on 
arguments from Will ig (1976). In addition, it is conventional to explicitly or implicitly 
invoke Harberger's (1971) "Three Postulates" of applied welfare economics. 1 when 
these assumptions are valid, the consumer benefits from consumption may be measured 
as the area beneath the ordinary demand curve, so that net changes in consumer welfare 
may be measured using Marshallian consumer surplus, and the area beneath the supply 
curve is a measure of total costs, so that changes in the net welfare of producers may be 
measured using producer surplus or quasi-rent. 2 
One of the key points to be made in the pages that follow is that supply conditions, 
especially elasticities of factor supply but also factor cost shares and elasticities of
substitution among factors, are primary determinants of the incidence of policies. 
Supply analysis is difficult in a range of dimensions, including the inherent dynamics, 
uncertainty, and the role of expectations. Here, we abstract completely from the truly 
1 These postulates are (a) that the competitive demand price for a given unit measures the value of that unit 
to the demander, (b) that the competitive supply price for a given unit measures the value of tha  unit to the 
supplier, and (c) that when evaluating the net benefits or costs of a given pohcy action, the costs and benefits 
should be added without regard to the individual(s) to whom they accrue. Harberger (1971) also discusses the 
implications ofmultiple market distortions in general equilibrium for these welfare measures and provides a 
multiple-distortion deadweight-loss measure. 
2 In a comprehensive review of empirical approaches to the measurement of welfare, Slesnick (1998) 
reviewed the literature documenting the shortcomings f Marshallian consumer surplus as a measure of 
consumer welfare and social weff re. 
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dynamic and uncertain ature of agricultural supply response and, for the most part, 
consider comparative-static analysis with a given supply curve. But we do consider the 
implications of an increasing elasticity of supply, with increasing length of run, for 
the longer-run incidence of policy - the evolution of the incidence with the evolution 
of supply response. Notably, one of the first empirical studies of agricultural policy 
incidence was by Nerlove (1958) in a study titled The Dynamics of  Supply. 
A related issue concerns the degree of aggregation across markets. As we aggregate 
across commodities, upply becomes less elastic, in particular because the inelasticity of 
the total supply of land becomes increasingly more relevant as a constraint. For the most 
part, here, we will be considering policies for individual commodities, commodities 
for which it is not appropriate to regard the supply of land as absolutely fixed (even 
if it were appropriate for a nation as a whole, when considering all agricultural 
commodities together). Only if we are considering changes in a policy that affects all 
of the commodities together is it reasonable to consider the market for an aggregate 
agricultural commodity with a fixed supply of land. Even then, a multimarket model, 
taking appropriate account of the differences among commodities, is likely to be more 
meaningful, unless the commodities all experience the same policy effects. 
Many policies affect agriculture. However, attention here will be limited to policies 
that are applied directly through farm commodity markets or input markets with a view 
to raising returns toproducers) In Section 2, we consider output subsidies and output 
quotas in the context of a single-market, closed-economy model. Since international 
trade is important in most agricultural commodity markets, in Section 3 we extend the 
discussion to consider markets and policies for traded goods. We limit our coverage 
of those aspects, though, since international trade and trade policy are the subject of 
another chapter. In Section 4, we consider vertical inkages in multimarket models, 
which allows us to extend the set of instruments to consider subsidies or quotas on 
inputs. While we consider small multimarket models, the analysis here is restricted to 
partial equilibrium models. 
In all of these models, for each instrument, we consider the effects on prices and 
quantities of output (and, where relevant, inputs) and, accordingly, on economic welfare 
and its distribution among taxpayers, consumers, andproducers (and, where relevant, 
input suppliers). We consider both simple policies and policies involving combinations 
of instruments, and we compare policies in terms of their transfer efficiency, using 
conventional stylized models of policies and markets. In addition, we maintain the 
assumptions that imply that changes in producer and consumer surplus are appropriate 
measures of welfare change: static supply and demand, perfect knowledge, perfect 
competition, and perfect and costless enforcement of policies. 
In the subsequent sections we consider some extensions to the above models, in- 
cluding some more r alistic haracterizations of supply controls (Section 5), variability 
and stabilization issues (Section 6), the role of imperfect enforcement and other costs 
3 The same procedures could be used to evaluate ransfers toconsumers [e.g., Alston etal. (1999)]. 
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of administering policies (Section 7), and some implications of the dynamics of sup- 
ply response for the incidence of different policies (Section 8). Importantly, however, 
throughout the chapter we retain the assumption of perfect competition. Finally, Sec- 
tion 9 concludes the chapter. 
2. Single-market models of policy incidence in commodity markets 
Discussions of the formal analysis of the welfare consequences of agricultural policy 
often begin with Wallace (1962). Other influential articles in this area, published around 
the same time, include Nerlove (1958), Parish (1962), Floyd (1965), Johnson (1965), 
Dardis (1967), and Dardis and Learn (1967). Much of this work can be traced to the 
University of Chicago. 
2.1. The basic model 
Wallace (1962) compared the effects of two stylized policies in a competitive market 
for a non-traded commodity: (1) a marketing quota (which he called the "Cochrane 
proposal"), and (2) a target price and deficiency payments (which he called the 
"Brannan plan"). These two policies are depicted in Figure 1, where D represents 
demand, S represents supply, and the initial equilibrium occurs at the price, Po, and 
corresponding quantity, Qo. The policies are designed to generate a given price, P1, for 
producers. This is done either by fixing a quota of Q1, or by fixing a producer target 
price at P1, allowing the corresponding production of Q2 to be sold at a consumer 
price, P2, and paying producers a deficiency payment of P1 - P2 per unit. In this static 
setting the latter policy is identically equivalent to paying producers a per unit subsidy 
of P1 - P2, and for simplicity we refer to it below as a subsidy. Both policies result in the 
same producer price of P1, but the quota reduces the quantity produced and consumed 
to Q 1, while the subsidy increases it to Q2. 
The size and distribution of the welfare effects differ between the two policies, 
as shown in Table 1 (as is conventional practice, for this analysis it is assumed that 
quota rents accrue to producers and are included in producer surplus). An important 
distinction between the two policies is their effects on consumers and taxpayers. 
The quota policy benefits producers at the expense of consumers, with no effect on 
taxpayers, while the subsidy policy benefits consumers as well as producers, all at 
the expense of taxpayers. Producer benefits are greater under the subsidy, since area 
A + B ÷ C is greater than area A - (G + K). The net social cost or deadweight loss 
from the quota (DWLq = -ANS = areaB + G + K, where ANS is the change in net 
social welfare) may be greater or smaller than that for the subsidy (DWLs = area E), 
depending on the relative sizes of supply and demand elasticities. 
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Figure 1. Welfare effects ofa quota and a subsidy. 
Table 1 

Welfare effects ofa quota and a subsidy 

Changes in Marketing quota Production subsidy 
Producer Surplus (APS) A - (G + K) A + B + C 
Consumer Surplus (ACS) - (A + B) F + G + H + I 
Taxpayer Surplus (ATS) 0 --(A + B + C + E + F + G + H + I) 
National Surplus (ANS = -DWL) - (B  + G + K) -E  
Note: The entries in this table refer to areas on Figure 1 associated with each policy applied to generate the 
given increase in the producer price. 
The relationship between the deadweight loss measures for the two policies can be 
seen by approximating the social cost of  each policy, using l inear approximations of 
supply and demand. These approximate social cost areas are given by: 
1 2 2( e + 7"); 
DWLq = ~PoOo'c rl \ eO / 
\ 77 / 
where r Po is the increase in price, e is the supply elasticity, and ~ is the absolute value of  
the demand elasticity at the initial equil ibrium. The social cost of  either pol icy increases 
with the size of  the induced quantity change, and the size of  the price wedge associated 
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with that change. Intuitively, the quantity response to the subsidized price increases as 
supply becomes more elastic, and a more restrictive quota will be required to reach the 
target price as demand becomes more elastic. Thus, the social cost of the quota increases 
with increases in the demand elasticity and with reductions i  the supply elasticity, while 
the converse is true for the subsidy. As summarized by Wallace (1962), DWLq/> DVVL s 
when ~/> e, and vice versa. So, if demand is more elastic than supply (as depicted in 
Figure 1), the social cost of a quota is greater than that of a subsidy policy, for a given 
effect on producer price. 
A weakness of this analysis is that, in comparing the instruments, it may not be 
appropriate to hold the producer price effect constant. More recent work, which has 
its roots in articles by Nerlove (1958), Dardis ( 1967), and Jo sling (1969), has developed 
a more useful basis for comparing policies. 4 Rather than comparing social costs for 
a given increase in price or gross revenue, policies are compared in terms of their 
efficiency of redistribution, or transfer efficiency. 
2.2. Efficient redistribution 
Measures of transfer efficiency provide a means for comparing the benefits to producers 
with the combined costs to consumers and taxpayers, and to society as a whole. 
Several such measures have their roots in literature described above, but the idea was 
popularized by Gardner (1983, 1987a, 1987b). Gardner (1983) linked various measures 
of transfer efficiency to the graphical representation f agricultural policy incidence 
developed by Josling (1974) and showed how the results depend on elasticities. Using 
this approach, alternative policies can be compared graphically in terms of their 
efficiency in meeting aparticular goal. 
The graphical comparison of policies is facilitated by the use of surplus transforma- 
tion curves, which are typically attributed to Josling (1974). The surplus transformation 
curve (STC) for a particular policy instrument typically shows the range of combina- 
tions of welfare of producers versus consumers and taxpayers that can be achieved us- 
ing that instrument. 5 Several STCs, one for each policy instrument under consideration, 
may be drawn in a single graph. Then, given some target level of producer benefits 
or some acceptable cost to consumers and taxpayers, policies may be compared easily 
in terms of one of several efficiency measures that are defined below. These graphical 
representations allow us to compare policy consequences, to prescribe more efficient 
policies, and to understand policy choices. 
4 Nerlove (1958) expressed welfare losses per net increment to producer surplus as did Dardis (1967), Dardis 
and Dennisson (1969), and Dardis and Learn (1967). Josfing (1969) considered two objectives -increasing 
farm income and displacing imports - and compared policies in terms of the marginal and average costs per 
unit of each objective. 
5 The axes need not be defined this way. Reducing the problem to two dimensions i  helpful but not 
necessary, and for some problems it may be appropriate to aggregate consumers with producers versus 
taxpayers, or producers with taxpayers versus consumers. 
h at ange. uitively, the antity sponse e bsidized ice reases s
pply comes re lastic, d re strictive ota quired ach e
rget rice s mand comes re lastic. s, the cial st e ota reases
h increase e mand lasticity d with reductions n e pply lasticity, ile
e nverse rue r e bsidy. mmarized llace 962), q ~ WLs
en 1] ~ 8, nd e rsa. , mand re lastic an pply s picted
re ), e cial st ota reater an at bsidy licy, r i en
ffect roducer rice.
akness is alysis that, paring e struments, ay t
propriate ld e roducer i e ffect nstant. cent rk, ich s
s ots rticles rlove 58), rdis 967), d Jo ling 69), s veloped
re eful sis r paring licies.4 ther an paring cial sts r
i en rease ice gross venue, licies re pared rms eir
fficiency distribution, ransfer fficiency.
.2. icient istribution
sures ransfer fficiency rovide eans r paring e nefits roducers
h e bined sts to nsumers d xpayers, d ciety s ole.
veral such asures ve eir ots rature scribed bove, but e a was
pularized rdner 983, 87a, 1987b). rdner 983) ed rious asures
ransfer fficiency e raphical presentation ricultural licy idence
veloped li g 974) d owed e sults pend lasticit es. i g
is proach, lternative licies n pared raphically rms eir
fficiency eting rticular al.
raphical parison licies cilitated e e rplus ransforma-
i n rves, ich re pically ttributed li g 74). rplus ransformation
rve ) r rticular licy instrument pically ows e nge bina-
i ns lfare oducers rsus nsumers d xpayers at n chieved -
that trument.5 veral , e r ach licy trument under nsideration,
ay rawn i gle graph. n, i en e rget vel oducer nefits
e cceptable st nsumers d xpayers, licies ay pared asily
rms e veral efficiency asures at re fined low. se raphical
presentations llow pare licy nsequences, escribe re fficient
licies, d derstand licy oices.
rlove 958) xpressed lfare sses r t increment roducer rplus s i rdis 967), rdis
nd nnis on 969), nd Dardis nd rn 967). l ling 969) nsidered o jectives - creasing
rm come nd i placing ports nd pared licies rms e arginal and erage sts r
it of ach jective.
S xes ed t fined is y. ducing e roblem o i ensions lpful t not
ces ary, nd r me roblems ay ppropriate gregate nsumers with roducers rsus
xpayers, r roducers ith xpayers rsus nsumers.
2.2.1. Redistribution using an output quota 
The STC for a production quota indicates the combinations of producer and consumer 
surplus attained when the quota quantity is varied. An example is shown in Figure 2. 
When the quota is set at the initial equilibrium quantity, Q0 in Figure 1, the competitive 
equilibrium is reached, with a distribution of surplus represented by point E in Figure 2. 
Movement along the STC to the left of point E shows how much producer surplus 
increases and consumer surplus decreases as the quota quantity is progressively reduced. 
At point L in Figure 2, if PS 1 and CS 1 are those resulting from the quota quantity Q 1 
in Figure 1, then APS and ACS in Figure 2 correspond to the areas A - (G + K) and 
A + B, respectively, in Figure 1. 
The deadweight loss (DWL) associated with quota quantity Q1 is also shown in 
Figure 2. For any value of CS, the total DWL is seen graphically as the vertical distance 
from the STC to the 45 ° line through point E, while for any value of PS, the total DWL 
is seen as the horizontal distance from the STC to the 45 ° line. Thus, the vertical or 
horizontal distance from point L to the 45 ° line corresponds to area (B + G + K), the 
DWL associated with a quota quantity of Q1. As noted above, the DWL associated with 
a quota increases as the quantity distortion increases, so the DWL is always increasing 
as one moves further to the left from point E. 
DWL is a useful measure for comparing policies when the objective is to increase 
producer surplus by a certain amount. However, when benefits to producers vary across 
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Figure 2. Surplus transformation curve for a production quota. 
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policies, a measure of average transfer efficiency may be more appropriate (although 
comparisons are meaningful only if we hold constant either producer benefits or costs to 
others). One such measure is what Dardis (1967) referred to as the Relative Social Cost 
(RSC) of a policy, which is defined as the change in total social welfare (i.e., the negative 
of the DWL) per dollar transferred to producers (i.e., -DWL/APS) .  RSC is inversely 
related to the average fficiency measure used by Gardner (1983), the average producer 
benefit for each dollar foregone by consumers and taxpayers - i.e., APS/A(CS + TS), 
which he called "total redistribution". The primary advantage of Gardner's measure is 
that it can be seen graphically as the slope of the line going through point E and the 
relevant point on the STC. Because the STC is concave, Gardner's average efficiency 
measure is always decreasing (in absolute value) as we move away from the competitive 
equilibrium. Furthermore, because of the inverse relationship between average transfer 
efficiency (ATE) and the RSC of a policy (i.e., ATE = 1 / (RSC-  1)), the DWL per dollar 
transferred toproducers increases as we move along the STC to the left of point E. 
A final group of efficiency measures evaluates the marginal efficiency of the transfer 
to producers. The marginal efficiency of a transfer indicates how much of the next dol- 
lar taken from consumers (and taxpayers) will actually be received by producers, and 
is equal to the absolute value of the slope of the STC at a given point. Similarly, the 
marginal DWL of a dollar taken from consumers and taxpayers i equal to one minus 
the marginal efficiency. Finally, the inverse of the marginal efficiency can be interpreted 
as the marginal cost to consumers and taxpayers of transferring another dollar to pro- 
ducers, and one minus this marginal cost is equal to the absolute value of the marginal 
RSC of an additional dollar transferred toproducers. Because the first of these marginal 
efficiency measures i most clearly seen in graphs of STCs, it will be the focus of the 
following discussion. 
The marginal efficiency of the first dollar transferred to producers is equal to the 
slope of the STC at the no-intervention equilibrium, point E, which is - 1, reflecting the 
negligible DWL associated with a small restriction in quota. As the quota is reduced, 
each incremental dollar of welfare loss to consumers yields a smaller incremental 
producer surplus gain: the marginal gain in producer surplus diminishes and the STC 
flattens. This continues until the point is reached where the slope of the STC is zero (its 
tangent is horizontal), which occurs when the quota quantity equals the output quantity 
for a monopolist (point M in Figure 2). Further reductions i  quota will reduce both 
producer and consumer surplus. 
The relationship between marginal transfer efficiency and average fficiency is also 
of interest. Consider point L, where the tangent line is flatter than the line connecting 
points L and E. This relationship indicates that verage fficiency is greater than mar- 
ginal efficiency, and that the decreasing marginal efficiency of additional transfers is 
pulling down the average efficiency. Because the STC is concave, as one moves away 
from the competitive equilibrium, both marginal and average fficiencies fall with in- 
creases in transfers to producers. 
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2.2.2. Redistribution using a subsidy 
The STC for a subsidy is derived as above, by evaluating the combinations of producer, 
consumer, and taxpayer welfare associated with different settings of the subsidy. 
Unlike the quota policy, however, taxpayers are affected by the implementation of
a subsidy. In order to reduce the STC to two dimensions, consumers and taxpayers 
are typically treated as one group, and consumer and taxpayer surplus are added 
together. Movement to the left along the STC in this case corresponds to an increase 
in the per unit subsidy. The shape of the STC for a subsidy differs slightly from 
that for a quota. While both STCs are concave, the slope of the STC for the subsidy 
is always negative over the relevant range of CS + TS, since producers can always 
be made better off at the expense of consumers and taxpayers - producer welfare 
always increases as the subsidy is increased. This is the primary difference between the 
subsidy and quota, since producer welfare cannot be increased once a quota has reached 
the monopolist's quantity. Otherwise, the interpretation and graphical representations 
of the various efficiency measures are the same for the STCs of the two policy 
instruments. 
2.2.3. Comparing quotas and subsidies 
In comparing the STCs for the two policies, the same types of relationships can be 
seen as were discussed above in the comparison of the two policies while holding 
the price effects equal. Here, however, we compare the policies for a given benefit o 
producers. The position of the STC for a subsidy relative to that of the STC for a quota 
is determined by the elasticities of supply and demand. When demand is more elastic 
than supply at the undistorted equilibrium (or when the two elasticities are equal), the 
STC for the subsidy lies entirely above that for the quota. In this case, for any PS, the 
subsidy will have a smaller DWL, and will be a more efficient means for transferring 
income to producers, on both an average and a marginal basis. 
Figure 3 shows a more interesting case in terms of policy performance. Here, supply 
is more elastic than demand at the competitive equilibrium. For a given relatively small 
transfer to producers, the DWL associated with a subsidy policy is larger than that of a 
quota, and both marginal and average fficiency measures favor the quota. However, 
when the transfer to producers is increased, the marginal efficiency of the subsidy 
eventually exceeds that of the quota. At some higher PS, the two STCs intersect, and 
the average fficiencies are equal. For transfers beyond that PS amount, the subsidy will 
have a smaller DWL and more favorable measures of average and marginal efficiency. 
Furthermore, producer surplus in excess of the monopolist's PS can be attained only 
by use of a subsidy. The main point, here, is that the relative efficiency of the two 
policies will depend on the size of the transfer as well as the supply and demand 
elasticities. 
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Figure 3. Surplus transformation curves: quota versus subsidy. 
2.3. Multiple instruments 
Alston and Hurd (1990) extended Gardner's (1983) analysis to show what happens 
when the policies are not mutually exclusive and may be combined efficiently. If a 
quota set equal to the competitive quantity were combined with a subsidy, transfers 
from taxpayers to producers could be made without any distortions in production or 
consumption because the quota would prevent supply response to the subsidy. Thus, the 
efficient STC for this problem is the 45 ° line in Figure 3 since, by combining the two 
instruments, the equivalent of a lump-sum transfer is achieved. 
The idea that combining instruments can increase transfer efficiency has been 
formalized and extended in several recent articles, going beyond two interest groups and 
two policies. One issue is the number of policy instruments required to achieve aPareto- 
efficient outcome, given a particular number of interest groups. Bullock (1994, 1995) 
has analyzed this issue. Bullock and Salhofer (1998a) provided theoreticaland empirical 
results on measuring the costs of suboptimal combinations of policy instruments, and 
Bullock and Salhofer (1998b) showed that under the usual assumptions, in general, the 
addition of another instrument cannot reduce transfer efficiency. A number of recent 
studies have measured the transfer efficiency of different simple and combined policies, 
including Kola (1993), Salhofer (1996, 1997), and Alston and Gray (1998). In earlier 
work, Just (1984), Innes and Rausser (1989), and Gisser (1993) considered the welfare 
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2.4. The marginal social opportunity cost of funds 
The analysis above rests on the conventional ssumption that a dollar of government 
spending involves a loss of taxpayer surplus of one dollar. In developing the STC for 
a subsidy, Gardner (1983) considered the effects when the social opportunity cost of 
one dollar of government spending is greater than one dollar, owing to the distortions 
involved in general taxation measures. Thus the marginal taxpayer cost of a subsidy 
expenditure can be represented as 1 + 3 times that amount, where 3 is the marginal 
excess burden or deadweight loss involved in generating the revenue to finance the 
subsidy. This excess burden includes the deadweight losses from distortions in the 
markets from which the tax revenue is raised (primarily, the labor market) along with 
taxpayer costs of compliance, and costs to the treasury, including revenue collection 
costs and other costs of administration a d enforcement ofthe tax policy. 
Most studies of the deadweight costs of general taxation refer only to the distortions 
in the labor market associated with income taxes. One issue in the literature has been 
the appropriate value for the relevant labor supply elasticity, which may depend on 
assumptions about what is to be done with the tax revenue. The response of the quantity 
of labor supplied to the imposition of a tax can be partitioned into substitution and 
income effects which work in opposite directions o that the uncompensated labor 
supply curve, including both effects, is less elastic than the compensated supply curve, 
including only the substitution effect. If all tax revenues were effectively returned to 
taxpayers - through either a lump-sum payment or the provision of public good - then 
the income effect would be eliminated. When the income effect is eliminated, the tax- 
induced istortion in quantity and the deadweight costs of taxation are larger. 
An extensive literature documents measures of the deadweight losses from income 
taxation and discusses the interpretation f the estimates. Relatively recently, Fullerton 
(1991) reconciled a wide range of previous estimates of the marginal social cost of 
public funds in the United States in terms of their treatment of the income effect. 
He suggested values for the marginal cost of public funds ranging from $1.07, when 
the income effect is included, to $1.25 when the income effect has been eliminated. 
Campbell and Bond (1997) reported corresponding estimates for Australia of $1.19 
and $1.24; 6similar estimates were obtained by Diewert and Lawrence (1995) for New 
Zealand. A value for ~ in the range of 10 to 25 percent seems plausible. In the context 
of benefit-cost analysis of the provision of public goods, Campbell and Bond (1997) 
and Campbell (1997) argue for using the larger value. They note that measures of the 
benefits from projects funded with taxes generally do not include income effects, and 
so neither should the measures of the costs. 
6 Findlay and Jones (1982) and Freebairn (1995) provide awider ange of estimates for Australia that may 
be more comparable to the range fiom Fullerton (1991) and the other U.S. studies. 
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2.4.1. Implications of  3 > 0 
To show the effects of 6 > 0, Figure 4 replicates the curves in Figure 3. If a dollar of 
subsidy payments reduces taxpayer surplus by 1 + 3 dollars, the STC for a subsidy alone 
is shifted down from b to b ~, while the STC for a quota is unaffected. This increases th  
likelihood that an all-or-nothing choice between production controls and subsidies will 
favor production controls. The reasoning is straightforward. For very small transfers, the 
distortion associated with a quota is infinitesimal and the marginal transfer efficiency of 
a quota is almost one. However, aone dollar lump-sum payment now costs the economy 
1 ÷ 3 dollars, owing to the excess burden of taxation. This deadweight cost of taxation, 
in addition to the deadweight loss in the commodity market caused by the subsidy, 
means that the slope of the STC for the subsidy must be less than - 1/(1 + 3), even for 
very small transfers. 
Consider, again, a subsidy combined with a quota fixed at the competitive quantity. 
The surplus transformation curve for this policy is no longer the line, c, with slope 
-1 ,  but, rather, the line, d, with slope -1 / (1  + 6). This line, d, is also the STC for a 
lump-sum transfer, as described above. However, when 3 > 0, the policy of combining 
a quota of Q0 and a subsidy is no longer efficient. As shown by Alston and Hurd 
(1990), a superior option would be to combine a subsidy with a production quota set 
at the quantity corresponding to point F, where the slope of the STC for production 
controls equals -1 / (1  + 3), and the marginal deadweight cost from further eductions 
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Figure 4. Surplus transformation curves and marginal social opportunity cost. 
. .1. lications 8 0
ow e ffects 8 > , re plicates e rves re . l ar
bsidy yments duces xpayer rplus 8 l ars, e r bsidy alone
ifted n from ' , ile e r ota af ected. This increases e
liho d at an all-or-nothing choice twe n oduction ntrols d bsidies
vor oduction ntrols. asoning traightforward. ry all ransfers, e
i tortion ssociated h ota fi itesimal d the rginal ransfer fficiency
ota l ost e. ever, e l ar p-sum payment w sts e conomy
+ 8 l ars, ing e ces burden xation. i adweight st xation,
dition e adweight s e modity rket used e bsidy,
eans at e slope e r e bsidy st ss an 1/ 8), ven r
ry all ransfers.
sider, ain, bsidy bined h ota ed t e peti ive anti y.
rplus ransformation curve r is licy ger e line, , h l pe
t, ther, e , , h l pe /(l 8). i , , is lso e for
p-sum ransfer, s scribed bove. ever, en 8 > , e licy bining
ota o d bsidy ger fficient. shown on and d
90), perior option ld bine bsidy with oduction ota t
t e antity rresponding int ere e l pe e for oduction
ntrols uals 8 , d e rginal adweight st m rther ductions
45° Line
o L.-----------------------~C~S-+T=S
ure . rplus ransformation urves nd arginal ocial pportunity cost.
in quantity equals the marginal deadweight cost of taxation. This option is shown by d' 
which is parallel to d, but above it. Thus, the curve EFd  shows the efficient STC for 
this problem, and it may be efficient o specialize in production controls or to use a mix 
of policies, depending on the size of the transfer to producers, and the values of ~ and 
the other parameters. For small transfers (i.e., points to the right of F), a quota alone is 
superior, but for larger transfers (i.e., points to the left of F), a quota combined with a 
subsidy is superior. 7 
3. Implications of international trade for incidence 
While the above models can be applied to any commodity, most agricultural commodi- 
ties axe traded internationally, and if we fail to account explicitly for international mar- 
kets the aggregate welfare m asures may not be accurate or relevant as a measure of 
national welfare. In addition, analysts could use inappropriately small values for elas- 
ticities if they failed to recognize that the total supply to the market includes relatively 
elastically supplied imports, or that the total demand includes relatively elastic demand 
for exports. Elasticities matter for both the total welfare effects and the international as 
well as domestic distribution of the effects. 
The introduction of international trade changes both the relevant elasticities and 
the computation of domestic, as compared with global, benefits and costs. It also 
increases the number of potential policy instruments, ince instruments may distinguish 
among different groups of consumers, or producers, or both. Further, international 
trade expands geometrically the possibilities for combinations of policies. For instance, 
U.S. grain policies in recent years combined supply controls with target prices and 
deficiency payments as well as export subsidies, food aid, and government stocks 
policies. Since most commodities are actually or potentially tradeable, policies that may 
appear to be primarily domestic are often made possible only through concomitant trade 
barriers - e.g., domestic milk market policies are often sustained by an embargo against 
imports. 
We cannot deal effectively here with the full range of the many different and 
interesting trade-oriented or trade-distorting policies used in agricultural commodity 
markets. However, the extension of the analysis of quotas and subsidies to the case 
of traded goods is straightforward and interesting, especially in case of a large-
country exporter. This leads naturally to a consideration of export subsidies and price- 
discrimination, revenue-pooling schemes, in comparison both with one another and with 
the alternative of a simple output subsidy. 
7 Chambers (1995) extended theanalysis of Alston and Hurd (1990) and Gardner (1983) to general 
equilibrium, and found that partial equilibrium easures tend to overstate the welfare effects of stereotypical 
commodity policies when general equilibrium feedback is important, as m y happen in less-developed 
countries. 
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3.1. Market power in trade 
Large-country trading nations, by definition, can influence the world market price by 
changing their quantities traded. Hence, as nations they have market power in the 
international market and can improve net domestic welfare by exploiting their monopoly 
power in export markets or their monopsony power in import markets. In order to obtain 
the greatest possible national benefits from production and consumption, a large-country 
importer might ax imports with an "optimal tariff" while a large-country exporter might 
charge an "optimal export tax". 
To see how this works, consider Figure 5 in which panel a represents he domestic 
market (with domestic supply, S, and domestic demand, D) and panel b represents he 
export market (with supply of exports, ES, and demand for exports, ED). The export 
supply curve is given by the horizontal difference between domestic demand and supply 
- i.e., at any price, the quantity on ES is equal to the quantity on S minus the quantity 
on D (similarly, ED is derived, implicitly, as the difference between demand and supply 
in the rest of the world). With free trade, the equilibrium is given by the intersection 
of ED and ES, resulting in a price of P0, so that the quantity produced omestically is 
Q0, the quantity consumed omestically is Co, and the quantity exported is E0, equal 
to Q0 - Co. From the home country's point of view, welfare is maximized when the 
marginal revenue from sales on the export market (MR in panel b of Figure 5) is equal 
to the marginal (opportunity) cost of exports, measured by ES. This outcome is achieved 
when the quantity exported is equal to El, which could be achieved by imposing either 
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Figure 5. Optimal export ax for a large country. 
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an export quota equal to E1 or an export ax equal to t per unit (and at the optimum, t 
would be equal to he reciprocal of the elasticity of export demand). 8 
With the export ax, the equilibrium price paid by foreigners increases to P1 + t, 
but the domestic price falls to P1, so that the quantity produced omestically is Q1, 
the quantity consumed omestically is C1, and the quantity exported is E~, equal to 
QI - C1. The welfare effects can be seen in panel a. Domestic consumer surplus 
increases by area A + B, domestic producer surplus falls by area A + B + C + E + F, but 
taxpayers gain revenue of tEl = area G + E. Thus, the net effect on domestic welfare 
is a gain equal to area G - (C + F) (equal to area H + I - J in panel b), and this 
amount is positive and maximized when t is set "optimally". An export quota set at 
E1 would have the same effects on producers, consumers, anddomestic welfare; the 
only difference would be that area G + E would be quota rent (going to those given the 
licenses to export) rather than tax revenue. 
Corresponding results apply for an importable good, for which there is an optimal 
tariff, which equates the marginal cost of imports and the domestic onsumer and 
producer prices (with the tariff rate equal to the reciprocal of the elasticity of supply 
of imports), and an equivalent optimal import quota. Terms of trade effects also arise 
through the operation of any other instruments hat affect traded quantities in a large- 
country trader, including quotas and subsidies applied to total production. 
3.2. Output quotas for traded goods 
An output quota alone cannot be a useful policy for transferring income to producers in a 
small open economy. When we see an output quota applied by an importing or exporting 
country that is a price taker in the world market, it is always in conjunction with some 
other trade-restricting policy. In these cases, trade restrictions prevent international 
arbitrage from undermining the quota's intended effects: to raise producer returns by 
restricting supply and thereby raising domestic onsumer prices. For instance, milk 
quotas are generally accompanied by barriers against imports and, when these quotas 
apply at a sub-national level, barriers to interprovincial or interstate trade. 
In a large-country case, where the country can influence the world price, a production 
quota still does not make much sense for an importer that aims to assist producers. 
A restriction of domestic output may drive up the domestic and world price for the 
commodity, but it would be a very inefficient policy, since producers in the rest of the 
world would benefit without having to restrict their production. In this case, producers 
could be protected instead by an import quota or a tariff, possibly with an increase rather 
than a decrease in domestic welfare, since the policy would work to the disadvantage 
of the rest of the world. Import barriers have been extensively applied as part of the 
8 The algebra and diagrams for "optimal" import tariffs and export taxes and related iscussion can be found 
in Corden (1997). Other distortions inthe economy may change the optimum trade taxes, as will allowing for 
> 0, which, in this case, implies that he marginal social value oftrade tax revenue is greater than one. 
xport ota ual I n xport x ual r it nd t e timum,
uld equal to e ciprocal e lasticity xport mand).8
e xport t x, e quilibrium rice id reigners reases I ,
t e estic rice l s I, at e anti y roduced estically I,
e anti y nsumed estically I, nd e anti y exported I, ual
I. lfare ffects n en nel . estic nsumer rplus
reases rea estic roducer rplus l s rea B + C + E + t
xpayers gain venue rea s, e t ffect domestic lfare
in qual to rea - qual rea I - J nel ), nd is
ount sitive nd aximized en t ptimally". xport ota t t
I uld ve e me ffects roducers, consumers, d estic lfare; e
ly ifference uld at rea E uld ota nt oing ose given e
nses xport) ther than x venue.
rresponding sults pply r n portable od, r ich ere n timal
rif , ich quates e arginal st ports and e estic nsumer nd
roducer rices ith e rif te qual e ciprocal e lasticity pply
ports), nd n quivalent timal port ota. r s rade ffects lso rise
rough e eration ny ther struments at ffect trade anti es rge-
untry ader, luding otas nd bsidies pplied tal roduction.
.2. tput otas r ded ods
tput ota lone nnot eful licy r ransferring come roducers
all en econ my. n e n tput ota pplied n porting xporting
untry at a rice ker e rld arket, l ays njunction h me
ther trade-r stricting licy. ese ses, rade strictions revent ternational
rbitrage m dermin g e ota's tended ffects: ise roducer turns
stricting pply nd ereby ising estic nsumer rices. r stance, ilk
otas re nerally ccompanied r iers gainst ports nd, en ese otas
pply t b-national vel, r iers terprovincial terstate rade.
rge-country se, ere e untry n fluence e rld rice, roduction
ota till es t ake uch nse r n porter at aims as ist roducers.
striction estic tput ay rive up e estic nd rld rice r e
modity, t uld ry ineffic ent licy, i ce roducers e st e
rld uld nefit hout ving restrict eir roduction. is se, roducers
uld rotected tead n port ota or tariff, ssibly h n rease ther
an crease estic lfare, i ce e licy uld rk e isadvantage
e st e rld. ort r iers ve en xtensively pplied s rt e
e lgebra nd iagrams r ptimal" port ariffs nd xport axes nd lated discussion an e und
rden 997). ther istortions e conomy ay hange e ptimum rade axes, s il l owing r
8 , hich, his ase, plies hat t e arginal ocial value f rade x venue reater an ne.
protective umbrella for domestic agricultural producers in most countries that protect 
agriculture, whether they have market power in trade or not. 
For a large-country exporter, an output quota offers similar benefits to an export quota 
(or export ax), but is less efficient since the output quota distorts domestic onsumption. 
A case in point is the farm program for U.S. tobacco, which has been analyzed in these 
terms by Johnson (1965), Johnson and Norton (1983), Johnson (1984), Sumner and 
Alston (1984), and Alston and Sumner (1988). These authors all concluded that the 
U.S. tobacco quota h d generated net benefits to the U.S. economy - the U.S. benefits 
from monopolistic exploitation of the markets in the rest of the world outweighed the 
losses from distortions in U.S. production and consumption. While not as efficient as an 
export ax, which is ruled out by the U.S. Constitution, the output quota had achieved 
many of the same benefits. Clearly, in such setting, a quota is a more efficient means of 
transferring income to producers than any form of output or export subsidy, which must 
entail deadweight losses - especially when ~ > 0. 
3.3. Comparing subsidies on output versus exports 
Following Gardner (1983), Alston and Hurd (1990) compared a range of instruments 
in terms of their costs of achieving a given benefit to producers in the case of a small- 
country importer or exporter. The results parallel those for the closed economy case. 
They showed that the introduction of 3 > 0 changes the comparison between policies 
that involve different amounts of government spending as well as between those that 
involve spending and those that do not, verturning some conventional wisdom that is 
based on an implicit assumption that 6 = 0. 
A conventional view is that trade-distorting policies annot be preferred to a 
production subsidy as a means of supporting domestic producer income. However, 
Alston and Hurd (1990) showed that, in the case of a small-country importer, a tariff 
combined with a quota and an output subsidy might be more efficient han an output 
subsidy alone, depending on the relative slopes of supply and demand. Moreover, the 
rankings of policies may change completely when 3 > 0. Certainly some tax on trade 
will be superior to free trade when ~ is positive, even in this small-country case. Indeed, 
an import ariff could yield net social benefits when a dollar of tariff revenue is worth 
1 ÷ 3 dollars of taxpayer surplus. 
It is not possible to rank all policies unambiguously from theory alone. As in the 
case of a closed economy, the ranking of policies in an open economy depends on the 
size of the transfer, elasticities of supply and demand, the marginal value of government 
revenue, as well as the share of production that is traded. Alston, Carter and Smith 
(1993) compared subsidies on output and exports for both large- and small-country 
cases. As they showed, the comparison of an export subsidy and an output subsidy 
for a given producer benefit depends on the difference between the cost of distortions 
in domestic onsumption under the export subsidy and the deadweight losses from 
additional taxation to fund the additional outlays for the output subsidy. The social cost 
of consumption distortions is infinitesimal for small transfers, but grows geometrically 
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with rising subsidies. A result that is surprising to some is that, for large values of 8 or 
relatively small transfers, an export subsidy could be more efficient han a subsidy on 
all output. 9 As well as changing the efficiency ranking of policy instruments, different 
values of 6 change the measure of the taxpayer costs and the net social costs. 
3.4. Price discrimination and pooling schemes 
A common policy has been to establish statutory authorities (such as marketing boards 
or state trading enterprises) that are empowered to price discriminate among markets. 
Some discriminate between fresh and processing uses of a commodity (e.g., various 
milk marketing authorities) and others between different geopolitical markets (e.g., 
domestic versus export markets). Among the best-known examples are the Australian 
and Canadian wheat boards. These types of policies have been studied extensively in 
general terms [e.g., Alston and Freebairn (1988)] as well as in particular instances 
[e.g., Parish (1963), Ippolito and Masson (1978), Longworth and Knopke (1982), Sieper 
(1982)]. A key feature of such schemes i that they are self-financing - i.e., no taxpayer 
expenditure is required. Rather, different segments of the total market are separated and 
charged ifferent discriminatory prices, the resulting revenue is pooled, and producers 
receive and respond to a unit price equal to the average revenue thus obtained. 
The simplest case, with a perfectly elastic export demand and a downward-sloping 
domestic demand, is shown in Figure 6. In this case, the domestic price is set above the 
export price, since domestic demand is less elastic than export demand, and the producer 
price (Pp) is equal to a share-weighted average of the domestic price (Pd) and the export 
price (Pe). The pooled price line is defined such that the pooled revenue for any quantity 
to producers exactly exhausts the revenue arned from the domestic and export markets. 
At the equilibrium, this means that total revenue (area B + C + E ÷ F + G) equals the 
revenue from the domestic market (area A ÷ B + F) plus revenue from the export market 
(area G). Hence, area A = area C + E. 
Alston and Freebairn (1988) extended the analysis to a large-country exporter. Alston, 
Carter and Smith (1993), following Sieper (1982) and others, argued that such a policy 
of regulated pricing and revenue pooling could be regarded asthe equivalent of either 
(a) an output subsidy of Pp - Pe per unit financed by a domestic onsumption tax of 
Pd -- Pe per unit, or (b) an export subsidy of Pp - Pe per unit financed by a domestic 
consumption tax of Pd -- Pp per unit. In this sense, price-discriminatory, evenue- 
pooling schemes can be considered as export subsidy programs financed by a tax on 
a particular group (consumers of the subsidized commodity), rather than on society as a 
whole. [Alston, Carter and Smith (1995) and Gardner (1995) elaborate on whether this 
perspective is reasonable.] 
9 As discussed byAlston, Carter and Smith (1993), other studies have justified export subsidies as a second- 
best correction for some other distortion i the economy - e.g., Itoh and Kiyono (1987), Feenstra (1986), and 
Abbott, Paarlberg and Sharples (1987). 
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Figure 6. Price discrimination and revenue pooling. 
The conclusions drawn from the simplest case - price discrimination and revenue 
pooling in a small country - apply also to a more general setting with multiple separate 
markets and market power in trade. For example, Alston and Gray (1998) compared an 
export subsidy against price discrimination and revenue pooling by a state trader having 
sole export powers (exemplified by the Canadian Wheat Board, CWB) as alternative 
ways of achieving a given benefit o producers. They showed that the effective xport 
subsidy per unit must be greater under the policy of a state trader discriminating against 
the domestic market (since production would be the same under both policies but the 
domestic price would be lower and domestic onsumption greater under the export 
subsidy). They also found that transfer efficiency was likely to have been greater under 
the actual CWB policies in 1994 than if an equivalent export subsidy had been used. 
4. Multimarket models 
The conventional supply and demand model, while powerful, has some limitations. In 
particular, participants in the commodity market are characterized aseither producers 
or consumers, and their welfare is aggregated accordingly. Even when we disaggregate 
horizontally, between domestic and foreign producers and consumers, we have still 
aggregated vertically across various suppliers of factors of production and final 
consumers. 
Our choice of which market o analyze implicitly defines how welfare measures 
are aggregated. For instance, if we study policy incidence in a retail market, benefits 
rice
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accruing to middlemen are combined with those accruing to all other input suppliers in 
"producer" surplus; if we study incidence in the market for the farm product, however, 
benefits to middlemen are part of "consumer surplus". Vertical disaggregation of
markets and the resulting welfare measures i important if we are to accurately describe, 
prescribe, and explain policy choices when the goal of policy is to transfer benefits to 
specific resource owners or interest groups (such as landowners or agribusiness firms). 
To disaggregate hese measures of policy incidence into more useful subaggregates 
requires amore elaborate model of supply and demand. 
At one extreme, we can envision a totally disaggregated general equilibrium model, 
in which consumption expenditures are endogenous and depend on factor payments 
as well as endowment incomes. At the other extreme, we have the single commodity 
market model, as discussed above. In between lie many intermediate cases with different 
degrees of elaboration of the vertical structure and factor markets, and the horizontal 
structure in terms of different commodities and spatial aggregates. Modeling several 
linked markets allows us to take account of cross-market effects, which may be 
important for accurately measuring the incidence in the market for the commodity 
in question, as well as for studying the spillover effects into the related commodity 
markets. 10 
In what follows we consider small, essentially partial equilibrium, multimarket 
settings, to see the implications of the vertical structure for incidence among factors. 
Similar models can also be used to consider the incidence of policy in a multi-output 
setting - where, when commodities interact in either production or consumption, 
policies applied in the market for one commodity can have implications for producers 
and consumers of related commodities. This type of multimarket s ructure was modeled 
by Buse (1958) and more recently by Piggott (1992) in terms of the equilibrium prices 
and quantities. Just, Hueth and Schmitz (1982), Thurman (1991, 1993), Bullock (1993), 
and Br~innlund and Kristr6m (1996) discuss welfare measures and their interpretations 
in this type of setting. An early study in this vein was by Hushak (1971). 
4.1. Aggregation of goods and welfare 
Welfare aggregations for vertically and horizontally linked markets are summarized 
graphically in Figure 7. Here, land, labor, and other (purchased) farm inputs are used 
to produce a farm product, and the farm product is used with other (marketing) inputs 
to produce a retail product. Each of these farming and marketing inputs earns a quasi- 
rent or producer surplus that can be measured from its supply function, and consumer 
surplus can be measured from the retail demand function. The interpretation of the 
area of producer surplus (and, indeed, the associated consumer surplus) in terms of the 
10 Such intercommodity interactions are involved in sector-wide (but nevertheless partial equilibrium) 
models of the agricultural sector, such as the USDA's SWOPSIM model, as well as in general equilibrium 
models [such as Higgs (1986)], and are reflected in the results when those models are used to measure the 
welfare ffects of policy. 
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Figure 7. Distribution of welfare in a multimarket model. 
underlying surpluses accruing to factors of production and consumers depends on which 
market is being studied. 
The welfare measures defined in each market are related in precise and interesting 
ways, as proven by Just and Hueth (1979). Provided that all inputs are necessary, and 
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that a positive shutdown price exists for output, the total surplus (the sum of consumer 
and producer surplus) is equal to area A + B ÷ C + D + E in every market. This 
means that we can measure the total economic surplus in any of the markets and get 
the correct answer. However, the interpretations differ among the markets. In the retail 
market, the consumer surplus accrues to purchasers ofthe final product and the producer 
surplus includes the surpluses accruing to all the inputs. Area D accrues to suppliers of 
marketing inputs, and area A ÷ B + C, the sum of the surpluses across inputs u ed to 
produce the farm product (area A to landowners, area B to farm labor, and area C to 
suppliers of purchased farming puts), accrues to the farm product supplier. 
The supply of the farm product at wholesale is derived from the underlying supply 
functions for inputs used in farming and the farming technology. The demands for 
the farm product and marketing inputs are derived emands, each depending on retail 
demand, the processing technology, and the supply of the other. Accordingly, consumer 
surplus in the farm product market includes retail consumer surplus and the producer 
surplus accruing to marketing input suppliers, while consumer surplus in the market for 
marketing inputs includes retail consumer surplus and farm product producer surplus. 
The demands for all of the inputs used in farming are derived demands, each depending 
on the demand for the farm product (which is itself a derived demand) and the supplies 
of the other inputs used in farming. Consumer surplus in each of the farm input markets 
includes the consumer surplus in the market for the farm product and the quasi-rents 
accruing to the other farm inputs.I 1 
Similar relationships among the surplus measures can be seen in all vertically and 
horizontally linked markets, so long as the issue is not confounded by price feedback 
effects (i.e., so long as any endogenous prices of one input are not arguments of supply 
for another input). In any given market, "consumer" surplus includes the consumer 
surplus of the market directly above it in the production process (i.e., the market for 
which it is an input) as well as the quasi-rent accruing to suppliers of other inputs used 
at the same stage of production. The area of producer surplus in any market includes 
the quasi-rent accruing to suppliers of all inputs used to produce the product supplied 
to that market (e.g., farm product and marketing inputs for retail; land, labor, and other 
inputs for farm product). 
A policy that is introduced in the market for any of the factors, or the output, affects 
the factor suppliers by inducing a shift in the demand for their factor. Hence, for 
example, whether suppliers of land to the industry in question benefit from a subsidy 
on purchased inputs (such as, say, a fertilizer subsidy) depends on whether the derived 
11 In some settings, general-equilibrium type feedback of price effects into supply and emand equations 
means that one cannot disentangle the total surplus in such a fashion [for instance, see Thurman (1991, 1993)]. 
In the meat industry, if supplies of hogs and chickens are related (i.e., if they compete for and both influence 
the price of feed grains) and the demands are related for pork and poultry, then we have multiple sources of 
general equilibrium feedback and the producer and consumer surplus areas do not have welfare significance. 
Here, since all of the underlying factor supply functions and the final demand function are independent ofone 
another, xlo such problems arise. 
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demand for land is induced to rise or fall. This depends in turn on a complex set of 
induced changes in the demands and thus prices of all the other factors, and the cross- 
elasticities of demand for land with respect to those prices. 12 Thus, as shown in Figure 8, 
a fertilizer subsidy could lead to an increase in demand for land, but reduced emand for 
farm labor, an increased supply of the farm product, an increased emand for marketing 
inputs, and an increased retail supply. In this hypothetical case, landowners, fertilizer 
suppliers, middlemen, and consumers all gain, but suppliers of labor (i.e., farmers) 
lose. Producer surplus measured in the market for the agricultural product increases, 
but within that aggregate, there is a hidden loss to suppliers of farm labor. 
In this section we develop some more formal models of policy incidence in 
multimarket models, to establish the determinants of the types of results illustrated in 
Figure 8. The distribution of producer surplus among the factors of production is most 
readily seen in the most basic example, which is presented first, that of two inputs used 
in fixed proportions to produce a single output. We then relax the assumption of fixed 
factor proportions. 
4.2. Two factors with fixed factor proportions 
Figure 9 shows the markets for a retail product (panel a), and the marketing inputs 
(panel b) and farm product (panel c) used to produce it. Since we have fixed proportions 
between the farm product (F) and the marketing inputs (M) in the production of the 
retail product (R), we can choose appropriate quantity units (so that one unit of output 
is produced using one unit of each of the inputs), and arrange the panels vertically as 
shown, so that the quantities of the inputs and output change together in lock step. 13 
Given the demand for the retail product (DR), the technology of production (the fixed 
factor proportions), and the supply functions for marketing inputs (SM) and the farm 
product (SF), we can derive demand functions for each of the two inputs (DM and DF) 
and the supply function for the retail product (SR). For any given quantity of output, the 
willingness to pay for the corresponding quantity of one input is equal to the price per 
unit of the retail product minus the marginal cost of the other input. Thus, the demand 
for each input is simply the vertical difference between the retail product demand and 
the supply of the other input. Similarly, the marginal cost a retail is equal to the sum of 
the marginal costs of the two inputs per unit of output, so that the retail supply function 
is simply the vertical sum of the two factor supply functions. These derived supply 
12 In the limiting case, when all the other factor prices are exogenous (i.e., the supplies are all perfectly 

elastic), the issue reduces to whether land and purchased inputs are substitutes or complements; otherwise it 

is more complicated (although it is essentially the same idea) to establish whether an increase insupply of one 

factor leads to anincrease indemand for another, holding constant thesupply functions of the other factors. 

This can be thought of as a "total" cross-price elasticity of factor demand inthe terminology ofBuse (1958); 

also, see Piggott (1992). 

13 Friedman (1976) describes a model of the production of knives using blades and handles in fixed 

proportions, which was first used by Marshall (1949, pp. 383-384). 
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Figure 8. Hypothetical incidence of a subsidy on purchased inputs in a mnltimarket model. 
and demand relationships show how the elasticities of the three underlying functions, 
and the factor shares, determine the elasticities of output supply and derived emand. 
Increasing the elasticity of supply of either input increases the elasticity of supply of 
output and the lasticity of demand for the other input, and increasing the elasticity of 
demand for output increases the elasticities of demand for both inputs. 
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Equilibrium in the retail market is given by the intersection of DR and SR, with a 
quantity of QR 0 and a price of PRo. Corresponding to this are equilibria in the other 
markets with quantities and prices of marketing inputs, QM 0 and PMo, and of the 
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Table 2 

Surplus distribution in a model with two factors used in fixed proportions 

Market Producer surplus Consumer surplus Total (net) surplus 
(PS) (CS) (NS) 
Retail B=D+ F A A + B= A + D+ F 
Marketing input D C = A + F C + D = A + D + F 
Farm product F E = A + D E + F = A + D + F 
Note: The entries in this table refer to areas in Figure 9. 
farm product, QF o and PFo. As above, our measures of producer, consumer, and total 
economic surplus (PS, CS, and NS) depend on which market we look at. Table 2 lists 
the surplus measures for each market, and shows how they relate to one another, in 
accordance with the above discussion of vertical markets. 
The two-factor, fixed-proportions model can be used to consider the incidence of 
policies applied in the different markets; for instance, a subsidy or quota in the farm or 
retail markets. It can easily be seen in the model in Figure 9 that the incidence does not 
depend on whether a per unit subsidy or quota pplies to output or an input when we 
have fixed factor proportions; only the elasticities of factor supply and retail demand, 
and factor shares matter. The assumption of fixed factor proportions means a quota, 
QR 1 , in the output market is identically equivalent to the same quota in either input 
market (QF 1 or QM 1). Similarly, a per unit subsidy on either input would have the exact 
same price, quantity, and welfare effects as would result if the same per unit subsidy 
were applied to the output market. Nevertheless, if we choose to study incidence in only 
one market, we must choose that market with a view to isolating the welfare effects 
of particular interest. The equivalence of the effects of a policy (quota or subsidy), 
regardless of whether it applies to an input or output, is a direct consequence of the 
assumption of fixed factor proportions. In the next section we relax this assumption, 
and see that the incidence of a policy depends on where it is implemented. 
4.3. Two factors with variable factor proportions 
Variable factor proportions in production is more realistic and adds some interesting 
dimensions to the analysis. In this section, we use a market displacement model to con- 
sider policy incidence in an output market and two input markets. We can define the out- 
put as either a farm product or a retail product. In the first case, the relevant inputs would 
be land and other farming inputs, whereas, in the second case, inputs would include the 
farm product and marketing inputs. If we were interested in the effects of a policy on 
landowners, we must choose the first structure. Similarly, if we were interested in the 
effects of a policy on middlemen (e.g., processors), we would choose the latter structure. 
Two-factor, one-output models of agricultural commodity markets have been of 
two types. Some have assumed a relatively simple (and restrictive) explicit functional 
le 2
rplus i tribution odel ith o ctors sed d roportions
et
tail
eting ut
rm roduct
ducer rplus
)
+
sumer rplus
)
A+F
A+D
al (net) rplus
)
D=A+D+F
F=A+D+F
te: tries is ble fer reas Figure .
rm oduct, a d a ove, r asures oducer, consumer, and tal
conomic rplus , d pend ich rket k t. le ts
e rplus asures r ch rket, d ows ey late e other, in
ccordance e ove i cus ion rtical rkets.
-factor, d-proportions del n ed nsider e idence
licies plied e ifferent markets; r tance, bsidy quota e rm
tail rkets. n asily en e del re at e idence es t
pend ther r it bsidy quota a plies tput an ut en
ve d ctor oportions; ly e l sticit es ctor pply d tail mand,
d ctor ares t er. ssumption d ctor oportions means ota,
, the tput rket ntically uivalent e me ota ither ut
rket )' ilarly, r it bsidy ither ut ld ve e act
me ice, antity, d lfare ffects s ld sult e me r it bsidy
re plied e tput rket. erthel ss, cho se study idence ly
e rket, must choose at rket h w lating e lfare ffects
rticular terest. uivalence e ffects licy uota bsidy),
gardless ther plies n ut tput, irect nsequence e
ssumption ed ctor oportions. e xt ction lax is ssumption,
d e at e idence licy pends ere it lemented.
.3. o tors ith riable tor portions
iable ctor oportions oduction re alistic d ds e teresting
i ensions e alysis. is ction, e rket i placement del n-
i er licy idence an tput rket d o ut rkets. n fine e t-
t s ither rm oduct tail oduct. e t se, e levant uts ld
d d other rming uts, reas, in e cond se, uts ld lude e
rm oduct d rketing uts. re terested the ffects licy
downers, must choose e t tructure. Sim larly, re terested e
ffects licy i dlemen .g., oces ors), ld oose e tter tructure.
-factor, e-output dels ricultural modity rkets ve en
o pes. e ve ssumed latively i ple (and strictive) plicit ctional
form for the production function, such as the Cobb-Douglas or constant-elasticity-of- 
substitution (CES) form, or the Leontief ixed-proportions form shown above). Gisser 
(1993) provides a recent example using a CES model. Others have taken a local 
linear approximation to a general function, and modeled isplacements from an initial 
equilibrium. Floyd (1965) exemplifies this approach, although he used explicit constant 
elasticity models for factor supply and final demand rather than leaving those functions 
in general form. Muth (1964) provides a more complete set of solutions for essentially 
the same model - without imposing any specific functional forms. This approximation 
approach is in some senses more general than using explicit functional forms (since it 
admits more general forms of production technology). It is also usually easier, especially 
when we extend the analysis to allow for more than two factors or more than one output 
(although cases may be found where specific functional forms are easier to solve or 
have other advantages in more accurately representing particular policies). 
4.3.1. Equations of the model 
In all of these two-factor models, the basic structure includes a final demand, two factor 
supply equations, a production function (or a cost function) to represent the technology 
for production of a homogeneous product, Q, using two factors of production, X1 and 
X2, and equations imposing competitive market clearing. 14 Thus, we can model the 
market equilibrium of a competitive industry in terms of the following six equations: 
Q = D(P, A) (la) 
C = c(W1, W2)Q (lb) 
X1 = cl(W1, W2)Q (lc) 
X2 = c2(Wl, W2) Q (ld) 
X1 = gl (Wl, B1) (le) 
X2 = g~ (W2, B2) (lf) 
The first equation expresses quantity of the product demanded, Q, as a function of 
its price, P, and an exogenous demand shifter, A. The second equation shows the 
industry total cost function, which is assumed to be characterized by constant returns 
to scale. Thus, unit costs, c(Wl, W2) = C/Q, depend on the two factor prices, and, 
under competition, factor payments exhaust he total product [i.e., P = c(Wl, W2)]. 
The third and fourth equations are derived by the application of Shephard's lemma to 
the cost function, and are Hicksian (output constant) demands for the two factors of 
14 In his version of this model, Muth (1964), like Floyd (1965), characterized the technology using a 
production function instead of a cost function. A cost function is easier to apply, especially for more than 
two factors [e.g., see Wohlgenant (1982), and Alston, Norton and Pardey (1995)]. 
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production so that ci = Oc(.)/OWi. The fifth equation expresses the quantity of X1 
supplied as a function of its own price and an exogenous upply shifter, B1; the sixth 
equation is the supply of X2. The endogenous variables are the prices and quantifies of 
the output and inputs (i.e., P,  W1, W2, Q, x1, X2), and the exogenous hifters are A, 
B1, and B2. ~5 
Totally differentiating equations ( la - f )  and expressing the results in relative change 
terms (i.e., dX/X  = dlnX) yields equations in terms of relative changes and elastici- 
ties: 16 
dln Q = -~7 din P + ot ( la  f) 
dln P = kl din W1 + k2 dln W2 ( lb ' )  
dlnX1 = -k2o- dln W1 + k20- dln W2 + dln Q (lc') 
dlnX2 = k la  dln W1 - k la  dln W2 + dln Q ( ld  1) 
dlnX1 = el dlnW1 +i l l  ( le ' )  
dln X2 = e2 dln W2 +/32 ( l f ' )  
In these equations, ~x,fi~, and/32 express the effects of shift variables on demand and 
supply as general shifts in the quantity direction, in relative change terms. As before, rl 
is the absolute value of the own-price lasticity of output demand, ei is the elasticity of 
supply of factor i, ki is the cost share of factor i, and cr is the elasticity of substitution 
between the two factors. 17 This system could be solved either by repeated substitution or 
by using matrix algebra methods. 18 The solution consists of linear equations expressing 
relative changes in endogenous prices and quantities as functions of the parameters and 
the exogenous shifters. 
We can use this general model to represent specific price policies that operate through 
either input or output markets. 19 The shift variables take particular forms to represent 
the price and quantity effects of a subsidy on an output or an input; they take different 
values, combined with extreme lasticity assumptions, torepresent a quota on an output 
or an input. For simplicity we will drop one of the input supply shifters by setting 
/32 = 0. The results are summarized in Table 3 and explained below. 
I5 Muth (1964) also included shifters to represent neutral and biased technical changes, but these are omitted 

since technical change is not the focus ofthis analysis. 

16 This derivation uses the fact that the Hicksian factor demand elasticities can be represented in terms of the 

elasticity of substitution and the factor shares as follows: rllH1 = -k2o- , ~]H = k2a, tlH = kl a, 172H2 = -klCr. 

17 The elasticity of substitution is defined mathematically for the case of constant returns to scale as 

o-= o-12  = o '21  = CI2C/ClC 2 where c12 is the second cross-partial derivative of the cost function, c(W1, W2), 

and c 1 and c 2 are its first derivatives. For perfect substitutes, o- = ec, while for fixed factor proportions, a = 0. 

18 See Alston, Norton and Pardey (1995, pp. 258-260) for details. 

19 Gardner (1975) used an essentially identical model to analyze marketing margins, and Gardner (1987b) 

used related methods to analyze various agricultural policies. 
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Table 3 

Price and quantity effects of subsidies or quotas on output or an input in a two-factor model 

Output subsidy Input subsidy Output quota Input quota 
('t'Q) ('el) (3Q) (31) 
dlnQ rl[ele2+~(klel÷k2e2)]rQ klel t/(cr + E2) r 1 -3Q klr/(c~ + e2) 3 t 
D D D" 
dlnP O(a +k2elD + kl e2) rQ k181 (CrD + e2) rl 3Q/rl ~kl(a~+ e2) Ol 
/181(o- -I- 82) TQ [(k2o" + kl t])e 2 -}- 1"/o']81 el (a + 82) o 
dlnX1 T 1 OQD D 
D eZ((Y + 81) 3 kl(Cr~)e231dlnX2 t182(~+81)'CQ kl (°- - Dr/)8182 rl ~7 Q 
dlnW l t/(°" + 82) -CQ (klcr+k2rl+e2)Slrl (a +D782) 3Q (klff+k2n+82)31 
D D D p~ 
(a +e l )  ~ kl(O- - t/)din W 2 17(o" D + 81~) tQ k 1 (6 D - tl)81 tl D7 OQ DM 31 
D = o'(kle I + k282 q- r/) -]- t/(k281 + kle2) + g182 > 0, D f = cr(kl81 + k2e2) + 8182 > 0, and D/f = 
err 1 + 82(kl r / +k2o- ) > 0. 
4.3.2. Output subsidy 
An output subsidy at a rate 100tQ percent can be represented as an upwards hift of 
demand. Thus, setting "gQ = 0. ]_ gives the effects of a 10 percent output subsidy. In the 
model, the demand shifter, c~, operates in the quantity direction, so we set ~ = tlZ'Q 
to represent an output subsidy of rQ. The relative changes in quantities and prices as 
a result of an output subsidy are given in the first column of Table 3. The subsidy 
results in an increase in both the quantity and producer price of output, while the 
change in consumer price is a decrease: dln P - TQ. At the same time, with the increase 
in production, the demands for both factors of production have increased, reflected in 
increases in both the quantity and price of each factor. 
Given the price and quantity changes in Table 3, we can estimate the changes in 
consumer and producer welfare in any of the three markets, provided that both inputs 
are necessary and that a positive shut-down price exists in the output market. For 
simplicity, we can approximate he changes in consumer (or producer) surplus using the 
percentage change in the relevant price, multiplied by the initial value of consumption 
(or production). These approximations measure the rectangle of surplus (given by the 
price change on the initial quantity) but leave out the triangle associated with the policy- 
induced change in quantity. For small changes in prices, the rectangle is very large 
relative to the triangle, and the approximation error is small. 
The benefits to consumers are approximately equal to the relative change in the 
consumer price multiplied by the value of initial consumption- i.e., ACS ~ - (d in P -
TQ)PQ = (dln Q/~)PQ --= dln Q(PQ/~7). Similarly, the benefits to producers can be 
ble
i e and anti y ffects bsidies otas tput n input in o-factor odel
tput bsidy ut bsidy tput ota Input quota
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-oQ
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nsumer rice multiplied e lue itial nsumption- ., !l I -
) In /l1)PQ = I /l1). ilarly, e nefits roducers n
approximated by APS ,~ (din P)PQ = dln Q(P Q/e).  2° This amount is equal to the 
sum of the increases in producer surplus for the two factor suppliers. The benefit from 
an output subsidy to suppliers of input i is approximately equal to the relative change in 
supplier price multiplied by the initial value of that input- i.e., APSi ~ (dln Wi) Wi Xi = 
dln Xi (Wi Xi ~el) = dln Xi (ki P Q/ei ). In other words, benefits to consumers, producers, 
and input suppliers are approximately proportional to the increases in their respective 
quantities consumed and supplied. 
The benefits to suppliers of input 1 relative to suppliers of input 2, APS1/APS2, can 
be approximated ask l(a + g2)/k2 (o" + 81). Clearly, a greater share of the benefits goes 
to a factor as it becomes more important (accounting for a larger share of costs) or less 
elastically supplied. Let input 1 be land and consider the extreme case where el = 0 
(i.e., the supply of land is fixed), and consider the benefits to landowners relative to 
other input suppliers: kl (or + e2)/k2cr. If all the benefits of an output subsidy went to 
landowners, as is often claimed, this ratio would be oo. However, this can occur only in 
one of two extreme cases: either the price of input 2 is fixed and there is no producer 
surplus for its suppliers (e2 = ~) ,  or factor proportions are fixed (a = 0). 
The conditions under which all of the benefits from an output subsidy accrue 
to landowners are extreme, but may be appropriate at some levels of aggregation. 
However, it is often not adequately recognized that both factor supply conditions and 
policies differ importantly between agriculture in aggregate and particular gricultural 
industries. For instance, in his analysis of policies for individual commodities, Gisser 
(1993) assumed a fixed supply of land for each individual crop while all other inputs 
were perfectly elastically supplied. These assumptions are clearly inappropriate for 
individual commodities, and guarantee that all of the benefits would go to landowners. 
Such assumptions are more reasonable for agriculture as a whole. For instance, Rosine 
and Helmberger (1974) assumed a fixed supply of land and a perfectly elastic supply 
of other inputs except labor (which had a large supply elasticity of 2.6), and concluded 
that 92 percent of the benefits from U.S. farm programs went to landowners, and the 
other 8 percent went to suppliers of labor. The problem with this analysis is that Rosine 
and Helmberger (1974) modeled agriculture as a single industry, as though a single 
uniform policy applied to every commodity. The assumptions made in either study 
may be appropriate in some context or at some level of aggregation, but Gisser (1993) 
failed to match his parameters to his commodity aggregates, and Rosine and Helmberger 
(1974) could not match their policy instrument to theirs. 
4.3.3. Input subsidy 
To represent an input subsidy of "gl per unit on input 1, we set oe = 0 and fll = elf1. The 
corresponding relative changes in prices and quantities are shown in the second column 
in Table 3. Because the subsidy reduces the price output suppliers must pay for the 
20 e is the elasticity of output supply: e = {e Ie 2 + a(kle 1 + k2e2)}/{a + kle2 + k2e I }.
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input, the marginal cost of output production is reduced and the output supply function 
shifts down. In turn, this shift implies an increase in output quantity, a decrease in the 
output price, and an increase in consumer welfare. A subsidy on X1 unambiguously 
increases the quantity of X1 demanded, by lowering the price paid by output producers 
(dln W1 < 0). The change in price received by suppliers of X1, including the subsidy, is 
dln W1 + T1 > 0, giving rise to benefits to suppliers of X1. 
The effects on the X2 market are ambiguous, hinging on whether the inputs are 
substitutes or complements in production. If the two inputs are gross complements (i.e., 
< ~), the lower price of X1 results in an i crease in demand for X2, and the quantity, 
price, and producer surplus for suppliers of X2 all increase. If the two inputs are gross 
substitutes (i.e., a > ~), however, a lower price of X1 causes a reduction in demand 
for X2, and consequent reductions in price, quantity, and producer surplus in the X2 
market. Thus, an input subsidy aimed at transferring income to suppliers of X1 could 
either confer benefits or impose costs on suppliers of X2. 
The output and input subsidies can be compared in terms of their effectiveness at 
achieving particular effects for a given subsidy expenditure since, for equal subsidy 
expenditures, -cQPQ = rlW1X1, so that rO = kl'rl. From the equation for dln Q, the 
output effect of a rQ subsidy on output is greater than the effect of spending the same 
amount as a rl subsidy on input 1 if e2 > el (so long as ~r > 0 and el > 0). 21 Hence, 
for the same taxpayer cost, consumers will benefit more from a subsidy on output than 
from a subsidy on X1 only if X1 is relatively inelastically supplied. On the other hand, 
making the same substitution (such that rQ = klr l )  in the equation for dln X1, suppliers 
of X1 necessarily benefit more from a subsidy on X1 than from an output subsidy with 
the same taxpayer cost, unless we have fixed factor proportions (or = 0). In this case, 
Xl suppliers are indifferent between the two subsidies. Finally, using the equation for 
dln X2, suppliers of X2 will always prefer a subsidy on output over a subsidy on the 
other input (again, unless cr = 0, in which case suppliers of X2 are indifferent between 
the two policies). 
4.3.4. Quotas on output or an input 
The same model can be used to explore the implications of quantitative restrictions 
on inputs or on output, as done by Floyd (1965), for example. The effects of 
introducing a quota on output can be analyzed using the solutions above, by making 
the effective demand perfectly inelastic (by setting 0 = 0 in the solutions) and defining 
the displacement as a quantity reduction using ot --- -8  0 (where 8Q is the proportional 
reduction in quantity from the competitive solution) so that (1 a ~) becomes dln Q = -6  Q. 
The effects on price and consumer surplus are obtained using dln P = - dln Q/O, where 
21 Parish and McLaren (1982, p. 12) report an equivalent result, although t ey were identifying the least-cost 
way of achieving a given effect on output, an output subsidy or an input subsidy. They considered a case 
where one ofthe inputs was supplied by a decreasing-cost induslry. 
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is the actual demand elasticity (in absolute value t rms). Similarly, the effects of 
introducing a quota on one input, X1, can be analyzed by making the effective supply of 
that factor perfectly inelastic (el = 0) and defining the displacement as a quantity shift 
by /~ = -31 (where ~1 is the proportional reduction from the competitive solution) so 
that ( ld ~) becomes din X1 = -31. The last two columns in Table 3 show the effects of a 
quota that reduces output by a fraction 3Q, and a quota that reduces the quantity of X1 
by a fraction 3l, respectively. 
An output quota raises the consumer price and reduces the demand for both inputs, 
harming consumers and suppliers of both inputs. These effects are offset partially by the 
quota rents accruing to quota owners: only quota owners benefit, and their benefits are 
smaller than the costs imposed on consumers and input suppliers. The consumer share of 
the cost of the output quota depends on the elasticity of demand relative to the elasticity 
of output supply. The distribution of the cost between input suppliers can be seen in 
terms of the ratio, &PSI /APS2, which is approximately equal to k l (cr + e2)/k2 (~r + el). 
This is identical to the ratio of the benefits to the input suppfiers from an output subsidy, 
only now the effects are negative: suppliers of an input bear more of the cost of an output 
quota, the less elastic is the supply of the input or the bigger is its share of costs. 
An input quota also raises the output price, resulting in losses to consumers. 
Assuming that they own the quota, suppliers of input 1 gain from a quota on X1 (in 
the relevant range of quota quantities, their losses as suppliers of X1 from the reduction 
in quantity are more than offset by their gains in quota rent). 22 Suppliers of the other 
input, X2, may gain or lose, depending on whether the two inputs are gross substitutes 
(o- > 0), in which case they gain, or gross complements (~r < ~), in which case they 
lose. These results are opposite those for a subsidy on XI: when the two inputs are 
gross substitutes, suppliers of X2 lose as a result of a subsidy on XI but gain when 
the quantity of X1 is restricted by a quota. Thus, for example, landowners are likely to 
favor acreage allotments over output quotas, and they may be supported in this view by 
suppliers of other inputs that are close substitutes for land. 
4.3.5. Combining instruments 
As discussed above, single instruments are likely to be less efficient than multiple 
instruments combined. In the single-market model, we saw that an output quota at 
the competitive quantity, combined with an output subsidy, would be equivalent to a 
lump-sum transfer to producers (more precisely, to whoever owns the quotas). We also 
saw that it would be more efficient to set the quota below the competitive quantity 
if the social opportunity cost of government spending were 1 + ~ dollars per dollar of 
spending. The same ideas apply in the same ways in the context of the two-factor model, 
22 The effects on WI in the case of an input quota are obtained assuming suppliers of X l own the quota 
and the quota rents are included in W1. The price of X 1 excluding the quota rent, V 1, can be deduced 
using din V 1 = -dlnX1/el, where 61 is the actual supply elasticity. These two effects can be combined 
to determine the size of the quota rent. 
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with a less-aggregated view of producer surplus. That is, if the objective of a policy were 
to transfer income to suppliers of X1, an efficient policy would be to combine an input 
quota on X1 (set so its marginal cost per dollar of benefit o the input suppliers is 1 ÷ 8) 
with a subsidy on X1. 
The effects of combining an output subsidy with an input quota, a common policy in 
the United States, can be seen by combining the elements in the first and last columns 
of Table 3. The elements in the first column have to be adjusted to reflect the fixed 
supply of land, by setting el = 0, before they are added to the elements in the last 
column. In a typical representation, the effects on output and producer prices are likely 
to be in the same direction as with an output subsidy alone (i.e., both quantity and 
producer price increase), but the magnitudes of changes are reduced by the input quota. 
Of course, an input quota could be set such that output is less than the competitive 
quantity, more than offsetting the effects of the subsidy on quantity produced. Thus the 
effect on consumption and the consumer price is ambiguous, depending on parameter 
values and the size of the transfer. The effect of the combined policy on the rental price 
for land is unambiguously positive. If the two inputs were gross substitutes (a > 7), 
then the input quota on land and the output subsidy both would act to increase the 
demand for X2, causing its price and quantity to rise with benefits to the suppliers. If 
land and X2 were gross complements, however, X2 and W2 may rise or fall. 
Understanding some subtler policy choices may require a finer disaggregation into 
a larger number of groups that have distinct interests. Some [e.g., Babcock, Carter and 
Schmitz (1990)] have suggested that agribusiness interests (including both suppliers 
of inputs purchased by farmers and suppliers of inputs combined with farm products 
in processing) are politically influential, and thus there is merit in considering the 
incidence of policy alternatives on agribusiness in attempting to understand policy 
choices. To do this requires a less aggregative model. 23 
5. Supply controls - some extensions to the analysis 
Thus far, the welfare effects of policies have been analyzed under a number of assump- 
tions. We now begin to consider how the results may change when some of these as- 
sumptions are relaxed, and more realistic policy and market characteristics are intro- 
duced. First, in the present section (Section 5), we consider the implications for the 
analysis of quotas when we allow for limits on transferability, endogenous quality, quo- 
tas on inputs (as a proxy for output), and quotas under variability. Then, in subsequent 
sections we consider some further extensions to models for a more general set of poli- 
cies, including other aspects of variability (Section 6), enforcement costs (Section 7), 
and dynamic responses (Section 8). 
23 For instance, Alston, Carter and Wohlgenant (1989) extended the two-factor model to a three-factor model 
of a competitive agricultural commodity market, which they used to derive and illustrate he conditions under 
which agribusiness firms (i.e., middlemen orfarm input suppliers) may gain or lose from different types of 
farm policies. 
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5.1. Quota ownership and transferability 
In the analysis above, it was assumed that quota was given to producers, o that quota 
rents may be included in producer surplus. This assumption may be accurate for a new 
quota scheme, since quota is usually allocated to producers based on past production so 
that initially, quota owners are also producers. When the quota is freely transferable by 
lease or sale, as is often assumed, the interests of quota owners and producers become 
increasingly disparate over time. This arises because the original quota recipients 
receive a windfall gain of the quota rents accruing over the life of the policy (or the 
equivalent value by selling the quota), regardless of whether they continue to produce 
or continue to own the quota. On the other hand, producers who purchase or lease quota 
incur quota rents as a cost of production. As a result, in many instances, it is appropriate 
to treat quota rents separately from quasi-rents accruing to the suppliers of other inputs. 
The distinction between producers and quota owners adds one complication to the 
standard analysis of a quota. Another is introduced when restrictions on the transfer- 
ability of quota are imposed. There are usually limits on who may buy or lease quota, 
whether they are allowed to lease or must buy the asset, and how much quota an indi- 
vidual may own or use. In addition, there are often rules that make transfers inefficient 
(e.g., regulated rental or purchase prices, restrictions on when transfers may occur or the 
size of transactions, ora requirement that all transfers must be made through aregula- 
tory agency). If any of the restrictions are binding, then quota will not be allocated to the 
most efficient producers, costs will not be minimized, and the unrestricted marginal cost 
curve is no longer elevant. Higher production costs arising from restrictions on quota 
ownership or use may mean a reduction in producer quasi-rents, a reduction in quota 
rents, or both, but unambiguously reduce both the sum of quasi-rents and quota rents, 
and net social welfare. 24 B arichello and Cunningham-Dunlop (1987) documented com- 
prehensively the nature of the restrictions on quota ownership and transfer in Canadian 
agriculture and the sources of efficiency loss that they entailed. 
The efficiency loss resulting from restrictions on quota transfer has been the subject 
of several empirical studies, but has been more often ignored in both theoretical nd 
empirical analysis of quotas in agriculture. Alston (1986) estimated that limits on trans- 
ferability of hen quota increased the costs of producing eggs in Victoria, Australia, by 
approximately 20 percent. Rucker, Thurman and Sumner (1995) evaluated the impli- 
cations of restrictions on inter-county ransfers of U.S. flue-cured tobacco quota. They 
found that a move to free transferability would increase quota rents by 3.5 percent, 
but would also entail a 2.1 percent loss of producer surplus accruing to growers. Bu- 
reau et al. (1997) found that cross-border transferability of sugar quota in the European 
Union would result in a very substantial redistribution ofproduction with important ef- 
fects on net welfare and quota rents - even within country transferability would confer 
24 In addition, going beyond the static analysis, Lermer and Stanbury (1985) suggested that restrictions on 
who may own quota increase the risk associated with owning quota, since such restrictions mean quota isheld 
in relatively undiversified portfolios, and this cost of risk is leveled against the quota rents. 
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considerable benefits. A number of studies have considered the implications of trans- 
ferable quotas for milk. The issue of milk quota transferability in New South Wales 
was modeled by Neutze (1961), Parish (1963), Lloyd (1971), and more recently mea- 
sured by Lembit et al. (1988), Tozer (1993), and Drynan et al. (1994). Milk quotas were 
introduced in the European Community in 1984 and have been much analyzed since, 
beginning with Burrell (1989). Recent studies measuring the benefits of transferable 
quotas include Guyomard et al. (1996) for French milk, and Boots, Oude-Lansink and 
Peerlings (1997) for Dutch milk. 
Despite the deadweight costs associated with limits on transferability, imperfectly 
transferable quotas continue to be the norm. Sieper (1982, p. 65) suggested that the law 
of restricted quota transferability "may be as well established asthe law of demand" 
and hence, such restrictions should not be assumed away lightly when analyzing quota 
policies. 
5.2. Quotas and quality 
The typical policy analysis assumes that the commodity of interest is homogeneous. 
However, commodities are rarely homogeneous, and output controls can lead to 
distortions in the mix of qualities produced. That the United States produces and exports 
high-quality flue-cured tobacco, while importing low-quality tobacco, is thought o be 
- at least in part - a response to the tobacco marketing quotas. Such quality responses 
to quantity controls can be seen in terms of the Alchian and Allen (1964) theorem and 
Barzel's (1976) alternative approach to taxation. 
The Alchian and Allen theorem concerns the effects of per unit costs on the relative 
consumption of high-quality and low-quality goods. The original example concerned 
"good" and "bad" grapes grown in California. From an individual consumer's perspec- 
tive, prices are fixed, and the price of each quality of grapes for a consumer in, say, New 
York increases by the transportation cost. Thus, good grapes become relatively cheaper 
for a consumer in New York, and hence, a New Yorker will consume alarger proportion 
of good grapes compared with a person in California who has identical preferences and 
means. An analogous result holds for producers, as described by Borcherding and Sil- 
berberg (1978) in their analysis of why Washington apple growers "ship the good apples 
out". The Alchian and Allen theorem holds for individual consumers and producers un- 
der certain conditions, andapplies for any per unit cost that meets criteria described by 
Umbeck (1980). Such costs include per unit taxes and quota rents, the only difference 
being that the tax rate is exogenous while quota rent is endogenously determined by the 
interactions of supply and demand, given the quota quantity. 
Barzel (1976) addressed a similar phenomenon atthe market level in his alternative 
approach to taxation. Barzel noted that every commodity is more or less a bundle 
of characteristics. If a per unit tax is imposed, the tax statute will use a subset of 
characteristics to define the commodity, assuming that an exhaustive description is 
either impossible or very costly. As a result, the per unit tax is actually taxing the 
defining characteristics. In maximizing their profits subject o the tax, producers may 
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alter the characteristics included in their units of production. B arzel (1976) showed that 
the quantity of the defining characteristics ( pecified in the tax statute) will decrease, 
and the other characteristics will increase on a per unit basis. 
Just as the specification of a per unit tax will use some characteristics to define 
a "unit", so will the specification of a production quota. In general, a quota will be 
specified in terms of the commodity's physical characteristics, e.g., weight. Quota 
rents act as a per unit tax, so that Barzel's model can be applied and used to predict 
that, although the physical quantity of a commodity is restricted by the quota, other 
characteristics of the commodity, which implicitly define its quality, will increase. Thus, 
a quota will lead to an increase in quality. 
To estimate the welfare effects of quality responses to an output quota, James (2000) 
specified a model of two qualities of the same commodity, and imposed a quota to be 
allocated between the two markets. The average quality, measured as the proportion of 
production and consumption i the high-quality market, increased as the quota quantity 
was reduced. The increase in quality increased the producer benefits (exclusive of quota 
rent) and decreased the consumer losses from a given quota quantity, relative to the 
case where quality was held constant. However, the quota rent generated by a given 
quota quantity was smaller than that generated in the constant-quality case, reducing 
the efficiency of the policy as a means of transferring income to producers. When 
producers alter the quality of their production in response to a quota policy, the actual 
transfer achieved from a given quota is smaller and a more restrictive quota must be 
imposed in order to achieve the desired transfer, relative to the case where quality 
remains unchanged. 
5.3. Output versus input controls and slippage 
Production quotas as such are rarely observed. Usually, quotas restrict quantities 
marketed rather than those produced, and are typically found in industries where 
production is relatively controllable (e.g., tobacco, where weather effects on yields are 
relatively small) or in industries where marketing is controlled and a secondary market 
or storage is available to absorb excess production (e.g., manufacturing milk markets 
absorb production in excess of fluid milk quotas). When output quotas have been used 
for commodities for which production or marketing is not controlled, producers have 
found ways to subvert he quota, either legally or illegally. For instance, a marketing 
quota on feedgrains can be subverted by vertically integrating a grain enterprise with 
a livestock enterprise. Some response of this type occurred during the Australian 
experiment with wheat delivery quotas during 1969-1975. 
The difficulty of controlling production or marketing of output may explain, in part, 
the importance of input quotas in agriculture, especially acreage limitations on crops. 
Input controls may have been used as a proxy for output controls. In many cases, inputs 
are easier to control and measure than output. For instance, hen quotas were used to 
control supply in the Australian and Canadian egg industries because the raw farm 
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Although input controls may be easier to enforce, they can be less effective as a 
control over production, and less efficient han output quotas in other sensesY Given 
an input restriction, producers will inevitably alter their production decisions in order 
to make the costs of that restriction less binding. The most immediate response may be 
to use the highest quality of the restricted input (e.g., the most fertile land) so that the 
average productivity of that input increases. In addition, producers will likely intensify 
their use of other inputs, so that production is greater than it would have been if input 
proportions had remained unchanged. In the longer run, new varieties or production 
technologies may be adopted in order to increase output given the input restriction. 
All of these effects reduce the effectiveness of an input quota in restricting output, a 
phenomenon often referred to as "slippage". 
With acreage controls, slippage is manifested in yield increases. The extent of 
slippage under acreage restrictions i governed by the elasticity of substitution between 
land and other inputs. If this elasticity is zero, output is reduced in proportion to the 
reduction in land use, and there is no slippage. If it is not zero, output is reduced by 
a smaller proportion than land is, and in order to achieve a given effect on output, an 
even tighter estriction on the input is necessary. Some studies have found slippage to 
be quite substantial. 
The combination of acreage restrictions with price supports may have encouraged 
the adoption of varieties and cultural practices that increased yield at the expense 
of quality, as noted by Brandow (1977, pp. 258). For instance, Foster and Babcock 
(1990, 1993) estimated that the use of acreage allotments for tobacco had a very 
significant effect on both the level and the growth rate of tobacco yields, as was 
shown after the switch to poundage (marketing) quotas in 1965, when yields fell by 
12 percent. Tobacco quality is said to have fallen under input allotments and risen under 
poundage quotas [e.g., Seagraves (1983)]. Similarly, James and Alston (2002) found 
a statistically significant reduction in an index of French wheat quality in response 
to set-asides implemented as part of the 1992 reform of the Common Agricultural 
Policy. 
Environmental externalities associated with agricultural production may have impli- 
cations for the choice between input controls and output controls. 26 When input quotas 
provide a second-best correction for another distortion, such as an environmental ex- 
ternality, they may be more efficient han output controls; indeed, they could improve 
net welfare. Input controls that lead to intensification of production in order to increase 
25 We can use the equilibrium displacement model presented in Section 4 to compare an input quota on 
X 1 , and an output quota, both of which reduce output and raise output price by the same amount, by fixing 
~Q = kl r/(o- + e2)~l/D II. 
26 Lichtenberg and Zilberman (1986) modeled the effects of a target-price cum deficiency-payment scheme 
in the presence of environmental externalities. 
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yields (e.g., output per cow, per hen, or per acre) might reduce or increase xternali- 
ties associated with agricultural production. For instance, an acreage control wi l lead 
to an increase in the intensity of chemical use on the restricted acreage and may lead to 
an overall increase or decrease in agricultural chemical use (depending on the relative 
sizes of the scale and substitution effects). Therefore, an acreage control may increase or 
decrease the potential for externalities from agricultural chemicals. An increase seems 
more likely than adecrease in this case, especially since it seems likely that some exter- 
nalities are a function of the intensity of use of a polluting input, more than a function 
of the total use. 27 Alternatively, if a quota were applied to chemical inputs, rather than 
to land or output, output would be reduced and there would be a clear advantage of 
reduced chemical pollution. Similarly, hen quotas are likely to reduce any externalities 
associated with effluent disposal and might reduce them better than would an output 
quota that resulted in the same quantity of eggs produced. 
5.4. Quotas and variability 
A number of studies have examined the effect of variability of supply or demand on 
the impacts of quotas. Variability in supply or demand can change the market outcomes 
under a quota, and may accordingly alter the ffects of the quota on welfare and its 
distribution. A marketing (or production) quota insulates input suppliers from the effects 
of demand variability, but exacerbates the effects of demand variability on output price 
(by making supply perfectly inelastic). As a result, consumer welfare and quota rent 
have to absorb all of the variability from demand. By the same token, consumers are 
insulated from variability in supply (or marginal cost), which is absorbed entirely by 
changes in producer welfare and quota rent. 
Variability may also influence the producers' planned production choices under 
marketing quotas. Alston and Quilkey (1980) presented some heuristic arguments, 
suggesting that risk-neutral producers would be expected to aim to overproduce, 
on average, when production is uncertain. More recent studies have formalized and 
extended this analysis, with mixed results [e.g., Fraser (1986, 1995), Babcock (1990), 
and Borges and Thurman (1994)]. 
Variability may also imply some response by policymakers when markets change. 
When demand grows under a quota, either p ice must rise to clear the market, or 
the quota quantity must increase, or some combination of the two must happen. 
How the policy is allowed to adjust to accommodate the changes in the market has 
distributional implications. Sumner and Wohlgenant (1985) raised this issue in relation 
to the incidence of cigarette taxes on the U.S. tobacco market, Sumner and Alston 
(1984) elaborate on the same point in relation to more general shifts in demand for 
tobacco, and Brown and Martin (1996) provide some further esults. 
27 Hertel (1989) suggested that, without environmental targeting, acreage s t-asides likely exacerbate the 
chemical pollution of streams and groundwater. 
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6. Variability, stabilization, and policy risk 
The inherent variability in agricultural markets is widely recognized. In fact, it is 
often used as a justification for government intervention. Many policies have been 
implemented in the guise of stabilization but have their primary effect on raising the 
average returns to producers. As well as influencing the goals and rationale for policies, 
variability may change the incidence of a given policy. Policies that have the same 
incidence in a static sense, or the same incidence when supply and demand are at their 
expected values, may have entirely different incidence wh n supply or demand shift, or 
when actual values are realized. This section discusses issues related to variability, its 
effects on the typical static welfare analysis, and the trade-off between market risk and 
policy risk created by government intervention. 
6.1. The stabilization trade-off 
As was shown above for the case of a production quota, in general, policies that stabilize 
one dimension of the market (e.g., quantity) will inevitably increase the variability in 
some other dimension (e.g., price, quota rent, producer welfare, or consumer welfare). 
This is a common theme in the literature on stabilization policies. Policies that reduce 
price variability or output variability at thef rm level are likely to destabilize some 
other variable, such as gross or net revenue, which may be a more relevant target for 
stabilization. Indeed, some policies might reduce the year-to-year variation in prices 
while increasing the odds of a market collapse. 28 Some such policies have stabilized 
prices, quantities, gross revenues, or net incomes for some market participants, but in 
doing so they have increased the variability experienced by others. 
Several studies have examined this phenomenon i the context of trade policies 
and the variability of international prices. Johnson (1975, 1991) analyzed worldwide 
impacts of domestic agricultural policies and concluded, asJosling (1977) did, that freer 
world trade would lessen international price variability for most agricultural products. 
Sarris and Freebairn (1983) showed that, in the case of wheat, free trade would provide 
generally much higher and less variable world prices. 29 These studies showed that 
variability must be accommodated by adjustments somewhere in the market, and if 
one avenue for adjustment is closed (e.g., prices in one country), others must carry 
more of the burden. The variable import levies implemented as part of the Common 
Agricultural Poficy in the European Union provide an excellent example. Under this 
policy, import tariffs were varied in order to offset changes in the world price, so 
that internal commodity prices in the European Union were held constant. However, 
this policy increased the variability of world prices by two means. First, none of the 
28 Brian Wright (personal communication) likened a buffer stock scheme to eliminating the minor bumps in 
the road in exchange for introducing a 100-foot drop somewhere down the road; an odd notion of stabilization. 
29 See studies in Sumner (1988), especially cautionary comments by Bruce Gardner (pp. 170-173). 
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variability originating from other countries was accommodated by the European Union. 
Second, the policy meant that any variability in EU supply and demand had to be 
absorbed by international markets. 
6.2. Welfare analysis in variable markets 
A number of issues arise when we modify the typical static welfare analysis to account 
for variation in a market. One such issue is that the equivalence between certain policies 
in a static setting may break down. For instance, in our initial discussion fa target-price 
deficiency payments program, we noted that in a static setting this would be equivalent 
to a per unit subsidy (of Pl - P2 in Figure 1). However, this is not true when supply or 
demand changes. 
Consider a parallel, outward shift in demand. In the case of a target-price policy, 
producer price, and thus production, remain unchanged, while the consumer price 
increases and taxpayer costs are reduced, with a reduction in deadweight loss. In the 
case of a constant per unit subsidy, the same demand shift results in increased producer 
and consumer prices, increases in production and consumption, and an increase in 
taxpayer costs, but no change in deadweight loss. After demand has shifted, a smaller 
per unit subsidy is required to achieve the same effect on producer welfare as the original 
target price policy. In other words, the equivalence among instruments i  conditional on 
a given set of market conditions. 3° 
In addition to leading to a breakdown of equivalence among policy instruments, 
variability means that the expected (ex ante) incidence of policy will differ from the 
actual (ex post) incidence. Furthermore, because measures of policy incidence are 
nonlinear functions of random variables (prices and quantities), the expected incidence 
may differ from the incidence when markets are at their expected values. Those 
engaged in measuring assistance to agriculture often look backwards at the actual 
income redistribution conferred by a policy rather than what may have been intended 
or anticipated before market conditions were realized. In some settings, or for some 
questions, the ex post measure may be misleading. 
A floor price scheme is a good example. Suppose the government guarantees 
producers a minimum price for their commodity. In the typical ex post analysis, if the 
price floor had not been binding, it would be concluded that the policy had not conferred 
any benefits on producers, as if the policy had not existed. However, an ex ante measure 
would take into account he implicit assistance from the policy, which is based on the 
probability that the floor price would be binding. B ardsley and Cashin (1990), following 
Gardner (1977), suggested that the assistance provided by a government minimum price 
guarantee is equal to the value of an equivalent put option, and this value can be assessed 
30 In addition to domestic demand and supply conditions, when the commodity of interest is traded, changes 
in export demand or import supply may also break down the equivalence of poficies applied omestically or 
at the border [e.g., see Tyers and Falvey (1988), Falvey and Lloyd (1991)]. 
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using the Black-Scholes formula. Thus, whether the price floor is binding or not, the 
possibility that it will bind amounts to a transfer of benefits to producers from taxpayers. 
Bardsley and Cashin (1990, p. 219) estimated that the underwriting assistance provided 
an implicit transfer from Australian taxpayers to Australian wheat growers worth about 
A$20-40 million per year from 1979/80 through 1985/86, equivalent to a subsidy rate 
of about 2-4 percent. 
6.3. Producer and policy responses 
Variability and policies that affect the degree of market variability also have indirect 
effects. Risk averse producers may respond systematically to policies that change price 
variability. In addition, changes in market conditions may provoke policy responses. 
Innes and Rausser (1989) considered the implications of price stabilization for the 
incidence of the stereotypical U.S. commodity programs. They argued that if producers 
are risk averse and contingent claim (e.g., insurance) markets are incomplete, price 
stabilization will nduce a supply response. As a result, producers may produce more 
for a given guaranteed price than they would for the same expected price. This producer 
response will modify the incidence of the policy. In addition, a policy that stabilizes 
prices or net incomes can confer welfare gains even when there is no behavioral 
response, under certain assumptions about risk attitudes [see also Moschini (1984) and 
Innes (1990)]. Innes and Rausser (1989) suggested that these effects could be so large 
that the conventional welfare implications of a target price with deficiency payments 
are reversed: producers can be made worse off, and society as a whole, better off. The 
authors also derived conditions under which production controls would improve net 
social welfare, but they showed that, in this case, the static effects on producers and 
consumers would not be reversed by the introduction of risk and risk aversion. 
As noted above, market variability alters the incidence of policies. From a policy- 
maker's perspective, then, a policy must adjust to market conditions and the induced 
producer esponses in order for it to have the intended effects. Some studies have al- 
lowed for endogenous policy responses to changes in market conditions [e.g., Rausser 
and Freebairn (1974), Sarris and Freebairn (1983), Rausser and Foster (1990)] and, in- 
deed, some have advocated the adoption of flexible policy rules so that policies would 
adapt optimally when market conditions change [e.g., Just (1984, 1985), Love and 
Rausser (1997)]. Of course, perfect adjustment for market variation requires perfect 
foresight regarding supply or demand shocks, producer responses to policies, and the 
hypothetical price and quantity at which the market would clear if it were undistorted. 
The danger of designing apolicy whose operation and success depends on such perfect 
foresight is exemplified by buffer stock schemes, which have all, ultimately, collapsed.31 
Under buffer stock schemes, government purchases are made when the market price 
is expected to be "too low", and stocks are released when the market price is expected 
31 Wright (1993) discusses the dynamic in idence of agricultural policies generally, with some emphasis on 
floor-price schemes. 
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to be "too high". The success of such schemes, then, reties on the ability of government 
operators to beat the market. While this may be possible in some time periods, Wright 
and Williams (1988) and Williams and Wright (1991, pp. 396-397) note that budgetary 
constraints will eventually bind, either because of imperfect foresight or because of 
prolonged periods requiring government purchases. Bardsley (1994) documented the 
1989 collapse of the Australian wool reserve price scheme (essentially a buffer stock 
scheme). Before its collapse, the scheme liminated A$1.8 billion of reserve funds, and 
left wool growers with a debt of A$2.7 billion and a wool stockpile, much of which 
remained unsold ten years later. 
6.4. Policy risk 
A hypothetical benevolent government might introduce agricultural policies to reduce 
price variability experienced by producers, making risk averse producers and society 
better off, as suggested by Moschini (1984) and by Innes and Rausser (1989). However, 
the same intervention introduces another source of risk, policy risk: the risk that 
producers will experience a loss arising from changes in policy or a policy-induced 
market collapse. Hence, any government intervention i a commodity market is likely 
to involve elements of policy risk, and any policy designed to mitigate market risk will 
entail at best a trade-off between market risk and policy risk. 
Just and Rausser (1984, p. 129) presented a comprehensive discussion of how the 
design of policies can affect producer uncertainty and concluded that, "The inherent 
instability and riskiness of the U.S. food and agriculture system is the market-failure 
justification for U.S. agricultural policy. The implementation f policies to address uch 
market failures is often confronted with government failure. Political-administrative 
instabilities resulting from government failure can exceed the inherent instabilities of 
the private sector". 
Evidence about policy risk has been inferred by some from the rates of capitalization 
of quota rents into quota asset prices. For instance, Lermer and Stanbury (1985) 
estimated that costs of policy risk offset half or more of potential producer benefits from 
supply management for eggs, broilers, and turkeys in Canada. Lermer and Stanbury 
(1985) attributed all of the premium in the quota rental rate (rents as a percentage of
the quota value), above a risk-free rate of return, to diversifiable risk, which would 
not exist if quota were held in fully diversified portfolios; hence, it represents an 
unnecessary cost of "insurance" against loss of the quota income stream. Alston (1992), 
however, suggested that some of the premium must reflect he equivalent of actuarially 
fair insurance, so that Lermer and Stanbury (1985) probably overstated the cost of 
unnecessary risk-bearing from limited quota transferability. 32 
32 Seagraves (1969) may have been the first o raise these issues. Also, see Barichello (1981, 1996), Barichello 
and Cumlingham-Dtmlop (1987), and Johnson (1991) for further discussion on the capitalization f quota 
rents into quota values. 
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Other studies have sought to identify the capitalization of commodity programs 
into land prices. Various authors have proposed that government payments may be 
discounted more heavily than income from the market, when they are capitalized into 
land values [e.g., Just and Miranowski (1993), Clark, Klein and Thompson (1993), 
Schmitz (1995), Weersink et al. (1999)]. This could simply reflect an expectation that 
government program payments will not persist, which may have been an accurate 
prediction, and need not imply any risk premium as such, nor any waste of the type 
identified by Lermer and Stanbury (1985). On the other hand, the discounting could 
contain an element of policy risk and excessive risk costs. 
7. Costs of administration and enforcement 
All of the analysis above ignores the costs of administration a d enforcement of policies. 
Once we allow for these costs, taxpayers as an interest group are affected by regulatory 
instruments such as quotas, not just the instruments that involve subsidies and taxes. 
Taxpayers bear the costs of administration and enforcement and receive as benefits 
revenues raised from fines imposed as penalties. These costs therefore change the 
qualitative implications of policies, as well as their quantitative mplications, in terms 
of the distribution of benefits and costs, optimal instrument combinations and settings, 
and transfer efficiency. 
Costs of administration and enforcement may be quite substantial, and may differ 
among policies. The processes of initially allocating quota and dealing with the 
inevitable appeals for reallocation can be very cosily, as is well known to anyone who 
has witnessed them at close hand; every producer (or other presumptive quota owner) 
must be dealt with on an individual basis. Similarly, substantial costs of negotiation 
and rent-seeking arise whenever the elimination of a quota is seriously contemplated 
by government. The processes involved in introducing or eliminating a subsidy, on the 
other hand, are much simpler (and presumably ess expensive). The costs of introducing 
or modifying policies may be more important han the conventional measures of 
deadweight costs, yet we usually have no information on these costs and leave them 
out of the analysis. 
Once policies have been introduced, the administrative costs may be relatively low, so 
long as producers and consumers willingly comply. But some policies create incentives 
for producers or consumers to break the policy rules, and there is some evidence that 
participants in agricultural commodity markets will respond to such incentives. 33 We 
need to extend our models to account for optimizing behavior in those cases where it 
is profitable to break the rules, or where accounting for cheating will lead to significant 
changes in implications of policies. This requires taking into account the market incen- 
tives to break the rules, the odds of being caught, and the penalties. In addition, many 
33 For instance, when the egg market inthe state of Victoria, Australia, was supposedly being controlled by 
hen quotas, itwas estimated that he black market accounted for 10-30 percent of all eggs [Alston (1986)]. 
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aspects of enforcement are chosen by policymakers when they choose how vigorously 
to enforce policies and what penalties to apply to those who are caught in violation, and 
this too can be modeled. Finally, the direct costs of enforcement must be added. 
At one level, this calls for no more than a routine application of the economics of 
crime and punishment for which there is an extensive literature, beginning with Becker 
(1968). Surprisingly, perhaps, the literature on agricultural policy has had very little 
to say on these matters. Some recent work by Giannakas (1998), and Giannakas and 
Fulton (2000a, 2000b, 2001a, 2001b) has redressed a significant part of this deficiency, 
but much remains to be done. As will be seen below, the economic problem of analyzing 
a policy with cheating and enforcement costs, where the policy rules and enforcement 
effort are endogenous, along with the settings of the instruments, has many dimensions. 
Dealing with all of those dimensions makes for an intractable problem; assuming them 
away restricts the generality of the results. Here we will add some components of 
imperfect enforcement, but restrict attention to some special, comparatively easy cases. 
7.1. Quotas and cheating 
Suppose we have an output quota policy with costly (and, therefore, probably 
incomplete) enforcement [ his policy is modeled in detail by Giannakas and Fulton 
(2001a)]. In Figure 10, the unregulated supply and demand are represented by S 
and D. If effective, a quota of Q Q would result in supply of SQ, yielding a price 
of P1. At this price, producers would want to produce Q1, which is more than the 
competitive quantity, Qo. How much they will produce beyond their quota will depend 
not only on the odds of being caught and the penalty imposed if they are caught, but 
also on how those odds and penalties vary with the size of over-quota production. 
In addition, producers may be able to influence the odds of being caught by taking 
certain precautions, at a cost. Taking all these considerations into account, we can 
imagine a regulated supply function, SR, that coincides with the unregulated supply 
function for quantities less than the quota, but lies above it for over-quota production, 
reflecting the costs of cheating (including costs of avoiding detection and expected costs 
of punishment), added to the ordinary costs of production. 34 
As the regulated supply curve is drawn in Figure 10, the marginal costs of crime and 
punishment perceived by producers are initially infinitesimally small (perhaps reflecting 
that the odds of being caught or that the penalties when caught are negligible for small 
amounts of over-quota sales) but rise with the size of over-quota production. This could 
reflect a positive ffect of increasing over-quota production on either the chance of being 
caught, the costs of avoiding detection, or the penalty per unit of over-quota production. 
34 Alston and Smith (1983) drew a similar diagram to represent the consequences of incompletely enforced 
price floor egulations. The details of the nature of the shift from S to SR to the right of Q Q - pivotal as drawn 
in Figure 10 or more nearly parallel as drawn by Giannakas nd Fulton (2000a, Figure 1) or some other form 
- will depend on the nature of the relationship between cheating, the odds of being caught, and the penalty 
once caught. 
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Figure 10. Output quota with imperfect enforcement. 
Table 4 

Welfare effects of a quota withandwithout cheating 

Changes in 	 Quota with Quota with Effect of 
no cheating cheating cheating 
Producer Surplus (APS) A + C - (I + J + K) C + E - (J + K) E + I - A 
Consumer Surplus (ACS) - (A  + B + C + E + F + G) - (C  + E + F + G) A + B 
NationalSurplus(ANS=-DWL) - (B+E+F+G+I+J+K)  - (F+G+J+K)  B+E+I  
Note: The entries in this table refer to areas in Figure 10. 
Thus, the regulated output that is actually sold on the market, QR, is between the 
competitive quantity and the quota quantity, and the corresponding regulated price, PR, 
is between the competitive price and the quota price. Several interesting welfare effects 
can be seen in this figure, as summarized in Table 4. Under the perfectly (and costlessly) 
enforced output quota, producers (who are assumed also to own the quota) would gain 
area (A + C) - (I  + J + K).  If  producers cheat and expand their production to QR, they 
gain only area (C + E) - ( J  + K).  Producer benefits are lower by A - (E + I )  when 
the quotas are imperfectly enforced. However, the black market returns, area E ÷ I ,  do 
not necessarily go to quota owners. In addition, area E + I represents net returns after 
deducting the expected taxpayer benefits from fines (which also should be deducted 
from the deadweight losses). Consumer losses are smaller, by area A + B, as are net 
social costs, by area B + E + I .  
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How does cheating affect transfer efficiency? If we were able to impose a fully en- 
forceable output quota of Q/~ it would achieve greater producer benefits than the im- 
perfectly enforceable quota set at QQ, with a smaller deadweight loss. For the same 
reason, then, for a given producer benefit, transfer efficiency is lower under an imper- 
fectly enforced output quota than under a perfectly enforced output quota. In addition, 
the net costs of enforcement must be added to the other deadweight losses, further e- 
ducing the efficiency of transfers (even more so when tax revenues with a marginal cost 
of 1 + 3 are used to fund enforcement efforts). Policymakers can make the policy more 
like a perfectly enforced quota by increasing enforcement effort (which would shift SR 
further towards SQ), but this is simply a trade-off between the costs of enforcement and 
the deadweight losses in the commodity market. If that trade-off has been optimized 
already, then SR represents he least-cost regulated supply function. 
Figure 10 could also be used to represent the contrast between an output quota (set 
at Q Q) and an input quota set at the quantity that would be used to produce Q Q in 
the absence of intervention. 35In this case, however, the difference between S and 
SR reflects the increased cost of production under an input quota arising from the 
intensification of the use of other (nonquota) inputs, or slippage. In both cases, what we 
see is evidence of producers incurring expenses in order to circumvent the constraint 
of the quota, either the costs of cheating or the costs of distorting the input mix. This 
observation makes it easier to understand how input quotas are sometimes chosen over 
output quotas to achieve the same goal. Holding enforcement costs constant, an input 
quota would be preferred if SR-INPUTQUOTA is closer to SQ than SR-OUTPUTQUOTA-
This would be likely if producer costs of cheating under an output quota were relatively 
low (reflecting small penalties or difficult detection) or if slippage were relatively low 
(reflecting low input substitution possibilities). Theodds are pushed further in favor of 
input quotas if they are easier to enforce than output quotas. 
7.2. Deficiency payments and cheating 
Consider a target-price and deficiency-payments scheme, where the cheating takes the 
form of producers overstating the amount of their production in order to receive larger 
deficiency payments [this policy is modeled by Giannakas and Fulton (2001b)]. This 
situation is represented in Figure 11. Given a target price of Pr and no cheating, relative 
to the competitive quilibrium (P0, Q0) producers gain area A + B, consumers gain 
area E ÷ F + G, and taxpayers lose area A + B + C + E + F + G, so that there is 
a deadweight loss of area C. If producers cheat, however, and claim to have produced 
Q2 when in fact they produced only Q1, then they receive additional benefits of H, 
against which they must count any expected costs of penalties for cheating that is 
detected. But, as pointed out by Giannakas (1998), this additional amount is a lump-sum 
transfer from taxpayers and does not involve any additional distortions in production or 
35 See Alston (1981, 1986) for some discussion ofthis scenario. 
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Figure 11. Cheating with a target price and deficiency payments. 
consumption. Alternatively, if a total transfer of A + B were intended, and producers 
cheat by overstating their production, then the target price could be set lower than PT 
and the taxpayer costs and net social costs would be reduced (i.e., reduce the target 
price until the area corresponding to A + B + H is reduced to the size of A ÷ B in 
Figure 11). Ironically, cheating increases the transfer efficiency of a target-price and 
deficiency-payments policy. Of course, this assessment has not factored in the costs 
of enforcement, which will reduce the transfer efficiency, and some enforcement will 
be necessary in order to limit the total amount being transferred. Nor has it accounted 
for the deadweight losses from taxation to finance the policy and its enforcement. In
addition, the existence of cheating means that the benefits will be shifted towards those 
who have a higher propensity for cheating, which may not be consistent with the goals 
of the policy. 
These results show that, even in a very stylized representation f the problem, 
cheating may increase or reduce the efficiency of transfers. Given a quota quantity, 
cheating is likely to reduce the total producer benefit, the total deadweight loss, 
and transfer efficiency. With a target-price and deficiency-payments scheme, cheating 
enhances transfer efficiency, increasing producer benefits but with no effect on 
deadweight loss (if 3 = 0), or with an increase in deadweight loss but a reduction in 
the average deadweight loss (if ~ > 0). A more complete understanding of the effects 
of cheating and costs of enforcement and administration requires a more complete 
specification of the details of the penalties and so on. Once these details have been 
specified, empirical estimates of the implications of cheating may be simulated or 
estimated econometrically. 
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8. Dynamics of factor and product supply, and policy incidence 
The analysis in Section 3 showed how the incidence of policy turns on the condi- 
tions of supply of output and, ultimately, inputs. Understanding supply response is 
critical to understanding policy incidence. The models used above are based on sta- 
tic supply functions, and typify models used commonly in the analysis of commod- 
ity programs. Hence, in these models, policy incidence is static, too, and is deter- 
mined by the elasticities that characterize the static supply functions. In contrast, 
in econometric models of supply response, the most challenging elements relate to 
the treatment of uncertainty and expectations, the lags between decisions and their 
consequences, and the dynamic evolution of supply response) 6 Thus, there is lit- 
tle connection between the typical static representation of supply in commodity pol- 
icy models and econometric models of agricultural supply response, the most con-
spicuous features of which are dynamics and uncertainty. Questions arise, accord-
ingly, about the interpretation f measures of policy incidence based on static supply 
models. 
In a classic article, Cassels (1933) identified the key issues in analyzing agricultural 
supply response, and these have remained largely unchanged in spite of the major 
advances in theory, availability of detailed data, computing power, and econometric 
estimation techniques. A significant proportion of the rather extensive literature on 
supply analysis during the past 65 years has concerned treatments for problems raised 
by Cassels (1933). 37 Primarily these efforts have related to the dynamics of response 
and the formation of expectations, beginning with Nerlove (1958). That the essential 
problems persist can be seen in the more recent reviews by Colman (1983) and Just 
(1993). Both of these authors discussed the issues in choosing between models in 
which results from the (static) theory of the firm can be imposed as restrictions (e.g., 
static econometric models based on cost functions or profit functions, or programming 
models) and other models that connect less closely to that set of theory but, at the 
same time, are more realistic in their use of other theory related to dynamics and 
expectations (i.e., the so-called ad hoc single-equation econometric models). These 
discussions centered on the development of models with a view to econometric 
estimation and prediction, rather than policy analysis, but the same types of arguments 
can be made for policy models. There is a trade-off between the different ypes of 
model characteristics (consistency with static producer theory versus incorporation of 
36 In particular, biological processes in agricultural production take time, so that decisions about he 
commitment of inputs and planned production are based on i complete information about weather and other 
events during the growing season ( r several seasons), and about what prices will be when products become 
available for sale. These biological lags caninvolve several years in certain livestock industries, and much 
longer for some perennial crops and forestry. In addition, responses to given price changes and other events 
evolve over time, increasing with length ofrun as more things become more variable. 
37 Alston et al. (1995, pp. 18-19) provide a summary overview of that literature, including documentation of 
a number ofmore comprehensive reviews. 
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dynamics and expectations), the dimensions of which will vary depending on the types 
of questions being addressed and availability of data and so on. 
If we decide that we must use a more realistic representation f supply response, 
going beyond the simple static model used above, we also have to reconsider the 
criterion for the welfare analysis. Changes in producer surplus can reasonably be used 
to represent changes in profit in the simple static model. However, in a model with 
dynamics and uncertainty, we may have to define a different measure of producer 
welfare change and we may have to aggregate over multiple periods. Such approaches 
may be too difficult for many problems. 
8.1. Evolution of supply response 
As characterized by Cassels (1933) and many writers since, there is no such thing as the 
supply function but, rather, there is a family (or fan) of supply curves for a particular 
commodity - more elastic supply curves for longer lengths of run. By choosing a 
particular supply elasticity for a commodity we are, implicitly, choosing a particular 
length of run. 
Why does the supply elasticity increase with increases in length of run? In the theory 
of the (competitive) firm, factors are often defined as either fixed or variable (with fixed 
prices), so that the firm faces factor supply functions that are either perfectly inelastic 
(for the fixed factors) or perfectly elastic (for the variable factors). In the context of 
this theory, length of run is defined in terms of the numbers of factors that are fixed: at 
longer lengths of run, fewer factors are fixed. When more factors are variable, the firm 
has more dimensions for economizing on inputs as it increases its output in response to 
a price increase and, accordingly, marginal costs do not rise as quickly. This can be seen 
as a special case of a more general view in which firms face upward-sloping supplies 
of all factors of production (some of which may be highly elastic), that become more 
elastic as length of run increases. It is the evolution of these factor supply functions, 
becoming more elastic with increases in the length of run (or, equivalently, the reduction 
in the importance of quasi-fixed factors), that gives rise to the increasing elasticity of 
the output supply function. At the industry level, factor supply functions are likely to 
slope up even when prices are exogenous to individual firms. Here, too, the source of 
upward-sloping output supply is upward-sloping input supply, including the supply of 
firms themselves, and with increases in length of run the factor supply functions become 
more elastic, as does the output supply function. 
8.2. Implications of dynamic output supply response 
When we use comparative statics to measure the welfare implications of commodity 
policies, we are taking a static approximation to a dynamic problem. Figure 12 depicts 
a family of supply curves with increasing length of run and elasticity as we go from the 
market period (SM) to the short run (SsR), intermediate run (SIR), and long run (SLR). 
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Figure 12. Supply elasticity and length of run. 
These discrete alternatives represent a selection from a continuum of supply curves that 
all pass through the current equilibrium of supply with demand at point E in Figure 12. 
Suppose a target price is applied to the market for the commodity in Figure 12 at 
Pr. In the current market period no supply response is possible, everything is fixed, 
and the effect is to make a lump-sum transfer from taxpayers to producers equal to 
(Pr - P0) Q0. In the short run, some supply response is possible, output increases to 
QsR and price falls to PSR,leading to benefits to consumers, an increase in benefits to 
producers, and anincrease in the burden on taxpayers, with an associated eadweight 
loss. The supply response to the increase in price from P0 to Pr progressively expands 
to QIR in the intermediate run, and QLR in the long run, and the effects on price and 
welfare are progressively amplified. 
Given that the producer welfare effects change with the length of run being 
considered, which is the "correct" measure? Just, Hueth and Schmitz (1982) suggest 
two measures, each of which is a discounted sum of the changes in producer surplus 
over the life of the policy. When the relevant production function is intertemporally 
separable, the benefit o producers from a target-price policy is equal to the sum of 
discounted producer surplus changes, where the change in producer surplus for each 
future period is measured from a supply function of the corresponding (incrementally 
increasing) length of run. An alternative measure that does not require ntertemporal 
separability is the sum of discounted changes in producer surplus, as measured using 
the short-run supply curve for each period, less the present value of expenditures on 
investment in fixed assets. Bullock, Garcia and Lee (1996) extend the formal analysis 
e
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presented by Just, Hueth and Schmitz (1982, Appendix C) to allow for different (i.e., 
other than "naive") expectations processes in the evaluation of welfare change under a 
dynamically evolving supply response. 
The time path of measures of policy incidence will vary among policy instruments. 
For instance, with a target-price and deficiency-payments policy, the evolution of supply 
response involves ever-greater benefits to both producers and consumers, at the expense 
of ever-greater taxpayer costs and deadweight losses. In contrast, with a conventional 
per unit subsidy, the benefits may initially go entirely to producers but, with the 
evolution of supply response, may later shift toward consumers - and will end up 
entirely as a benefit o consumers when long-run supply response is perfectly elastic. 
On the other hand, with a quota, the evolution of supply response might not change the 
cost to consumers, and does not eliminate producer benefits in the long run, though it 
does reduce the quota rents and producer benefits over time. 38 This helps account for 
why quotas, and not subsidies, are more often found in industries for which the long-run 
supply is highly elastic, such as tobacco, eggs, poultry, and fresh milk. 
8.3. Evolution of factor supply and policy incidence 
As the length of run increases, the incidence shifts not only between producers and 
consumers; as supply becomes more elastic relative to demand, it also shifts among 
the factors. Some factors are relatively fixed in the short run and relatively variable 
in the long run. As a result, short-run incidence may differ qualitatively as well as 
quantitatively from longer-run i cidence, particularly if the policy induces technological 
change. 
For instance, consider the nature of the response of California's milk supply to a 
policy-induced increase in price. Ultimately, apermanent increase in production might 
imply a proportional increase in the use of all inputs. But it may take farmers in the 
industry two years after deciding to increase output in response to a higher price to add 
any additional cows to the total milking herd (although some short-term adjustments 
could be made by delaying culling). Additional output could be achieved perhaps by 
intensifying the use of other inputs such as purchased feed or growth hormones. In 
the short run, in which the number of milking cows is essentially fixed (corresponding 
to less than two years), the supply of feed to the dairy industry is likely to be highly 
elastic so that feed (or land) is not the limiting factor; cows are. In the intermediate 
run, however, say two to five years, the dairy industry can supply itself with additional 
milking cows at approximately constant cost. The cows are no longer the critical 
specialized factor. In some industries, and this might be an instance, processing capacity 
may be less elastically supplied than other inputs over the short and intermediate lengths 
of run, although it would be expected to be highly elastically supplied in the long run. 
38 Another possibility isthat quota restrictions may imply a slower rate of technological hange than would 
arise otherwise [ .g., see Alston (1986)]. 
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In the intermediate nd longer lengths of run, it may be managerial capacity that limits 
industry supply response more than other things. 
Thus, the incidence of policies in the dairy industry will change with length of run. 
In the short run, but not in the longer run, for instance, the primary beneficiaries of 
a subsidy may be the owners of milking cows, not always the same people as those 
who supply other inputs such as land, feed, or equipment used in dairy farming. The 
differential dynamic incidence of policy is even more readily apparent for specific 
instances such as the U.S. whole-herd buyout program, where compensating some dairy 
producers for exiting the industry, and eliminating their herds, benefited those remaining 
in the industry who owned cows, but only in the period before replacement cows could 
be (and were) raised [e.g., see Chambers (1987)]. 
These types of issues are relatively important where dynamics in supply response 
are relatively important. Perennial crops provide good examples. Alston et al. (1995) 
provide a comprehensive analysis of the California almond industry and its reserve 
policy. In the almond industry, like many other tree crops, after a decision has been 
made to expand production by planting new trees there will be long lags before those 
new plantings come into production (say four years), and even longer lags before they 
reach their productive potential (say eight years), which can be maintained for a long 
time (up to twenty-five years). In the very short run, there cannot be any significant 
production response to a price increase. The Almond Board of California has exploited 
that fact in diverting some production from edible uses (a type of price discrimination 
strategy) in order to drive up the market price for edible uses. In the short run this 
policy cannot be undermined by supply response to the higher average revenue that 
results from the diversion. In the long run, however, the supply of almonds is likely 
to be highly elastic (there is an abundant supply of land and other resources uitable 
for almond production and no evidence of decreasing returns to industry scale, and the 
policy does not limit entry or production). While this policy can raise average revenues 
and profits in the short run, in the longer run it stimulates entry and raises industry 
productive capacity, depressing prices. 
8.4. Dynamic evolution of markets in response to policy 
The farm program for U.S. tobacco provides another good example of the dynamic 
evolution of markets in response to policy, with some surprising implications for the 
incidence of the policy. As documented by Johnson (1984), when the farm program 
for U.S. flue-cured tobacco was first introduced uring the 1930s, the U.S. industry 
dominated the world market. From 1940, supply was controlled (initially using acreage 
allotments; ince 1965 using poundage quotas), which held up the domestic and world 
price for U.S. tobacco. Over time, in response to the higher price of U.S. tobacco, 
production in other countries increased and export demand facing the United States 
fell. 
In an analysis of the dynamic effects of the policy, Seagraves (1983) reported that 
during 1935-39, the United States produced 64 percent of the world's flue-cured 
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tobacco and 83 percent of the world's net exports. By 1980-82, these numbers had 
fallen so that the United States produced only 17 percent of world production, and only 
21 percent of exports. In recent years, the United States has been importing roughly 
one-third of tobacco used in cigarette production i  the United States, while exporting 
one-half of the tobacco grown in the United States. 
Alston and Sumner (1988) estimated the static welfare ffects in 1987, and concluded 
that the quota was close to the quantity that would maximize the net U.S. gains in that 
year. 39 But over time, the potential U.S. market power has been progressively eroded, 
as a result of some market power being exercised through the quota. Whether the policy 
has been dynamically optimal, so as to maximize the present value of U.S. benefits over 
time, has not been evaluated. 4°
Any policy by a large exporter that restricts upply to the world market (as for U.S. 
tobacco and almonds) raises the world price along with the domestic one, and confers 
benefits on overseas producers, to some extent at the future expense of U.S. producers: 
today's domestic producers may be gaining at the expense of tomorrow's. Conversely, 
policies that lead to greater output and exports of, say, wheat would be expected to have 
dynamic domestic onsequences arising from their negative ffects on competing wheat 
producers overseas. Domestic supply responses to subsidies on output (or exports) 
increase with length of run. At the same time, foreign supply response to lower world 
prices also increases with increases in length of run, which means that the demand 
for wheat exports also becomes more elastic with increases in length of run. Dynamic 
responses such as these account for the (surprising to some) shift of the European Union 
from being an importer, before the Common Agricultural Policy was first introduced, 
to being the world's largest exporter of wheat 30 years later, with significant political 
and budgetary problems ari ing from the larger-than-anticipated responses to the policy. 
Like U.S. tobacco, and California almonds, dynamic responses to the EU wheat policy 
progressively undermined the effectiveness of the policy as a means of transferring 
income to producers efficiently. 
9. Conclusion 
The incidence of agricultural policy depends on the details of the policies and the 
contexts in which they are applied, especially concerning the conditions of supply of 
factors of production to the industries concerned. It is necessary to account for these 
details that vary from one setting to the next. Hence, we cannot generally make the 
39 Sumner (1996) summarizes the main results. 
40 Studies have looked at the optimal time path oftrade taxes, and the same types of issues are likely to arise 
here. For instance, see Gaskins (1971) and Karp (1987). Alston et al. (1995, Ch. 7), analyze avery similar 
problem for the almond industry, although t e competitive fringe here includes domestic as well as foreign 
entrants. 
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types of broad generalizations that we may wish to make, such as that farm program 
benefits are ultimately capitalized into land, based on theory alone. 
The literature on the incidence of agricultural policies includes two main types of 
studies. Specific studies of particular policies (such as the U.S. tobacco program) or 
particular events (such as the collapse of the Australian wool reserve price scheme) 
sometimes tell us a great deal about incidence. However, not many of the empirical 
studies that have been done have characterized the policies, or the markets in which they 
apply, in sufficient detail to provide much information about policy incidence beyond 
the distinction between domestic and international, or producer and consumer welfare 
effects. In particular, few studies of commodity policies have provided clear statements 
about the elasticities of supply of different factors of production to the industry in 
question, which is a central determinant of incidence among factors of production. The 
other main type of study takes a more general look either at certain policy issues (e.g., 
broad-brush comparisons of particular instruments), or at agricultural industries (e.g., 
overall assessments of the effects of agricultural policy in the United States). While the 
latter types of study can teach us much about he determinants of incidence, they usually 
forsake too much of the necessary detail to offer much empirically, if our claims about 
the importance of details are valid. 
Two important elements of realism are often lacking from studies of commodity 
policies and their incidence. These are (1) a realistic representation of the policy 
instruments, and (2) an appropriate r presentation f the conditions of factor supply 
and product demand, and technology. In relation to the instruments, quite substantial 
differences in incidence can be found as a result of apparently innocuous details - such 
as whether a quota applies to inputs or outputs or is transferable, or whether we have a 
subsidy versus a target price with deficiency payments - especially when we allow for 
market variability and dynamics. 
In this chapter we have emphasized two main types of domestic commodity 
policy instruments, supply control policies (output or input quotas) and subsidies. 
For each of these instruments we have identified a real-world departure from the 
common theoretical characterization, which has potentially profound implications for 
the evaluation of each, and for the comparison between them. First, real-world quotas, 
whether applied to inputs or outputs, are typically not transferable, and this has very 
serious implications for the social costs of supply controls. Second, allowing for the 
deadweight costs of taxation to finance subsidies means that subsidies involve much 
greater deadweight losses, and a much heavier burden on taxpayers, than a conventional 
analysis would indicate. In addition, both subsidies and supply controls are costly to 
introduce, administer, and enforce. These costs, and the effects of producer responses 
to the incentives to cheat, also change the deadweight losses from each of the policies, 
their distributional consequences, and their efficiency as means of transferring income 
to producers. 
The second set of concerns relates to the (mis-)representation of the market context 
in which a policy is applied. We often see policies analyzed using unrealistic ombina- 
tions of assumptions about supply and demand conditions and policy instruments. For 
pes road neralizations at ay h ake, ch s at rm rogram
nefits re lti ately pitalized to d, sed eory lone.
rature e idence ricultural licies ludes o ain pes
tudies. ecific tudies rticular licies uch s e . bac o rogram)
rticular vents uch s e llapse e tralian ol serve ice heme)
etimes l s reat al out idence. ever, t any e pirical
tudies at ve been ne ve aracterized e licies, e arkets ich ey
pply, f icient tail rovide ch f rmation out licy idence yond
e distinction twe n estic d ternational, roducer d nsumer lfare
ffects. rticular, w tudies modity licies ve rovided ar tatements
out e lasticit es pply ifferent factors oduction e ustry
estion, ich ntral terminant idence ong ctors oduction.
her ain pe tudy takes re neral k ither t rtain licy sues .g.,
road-brush parisons rticular truments), t ricultural ustries .g.,
erall ssessments e ffects ricultural licy e ed ates). il e
tter pes tudy can teach s ch out e terminants idence, ey usually
rsake o ch e ces ary tail fer ch pirically, r l ims out
e ortance tails re lid.
ortant lements alism re ten cking m tudies modity
licies d eir idence. se re ) alistic presentation e licy
truments, d ) propriate presentation e nditions ctor supply
d oduct mand, d chnology. relation to e truments, ite substantial
ifferences idence n nd s sult parently ocuous tails ch
s ether ota plies uts tputs ransferable, ether ve
bsidy rsus rget ice ficiency yments specially en llow r
rket riabil ty and namics.
is apter ve phasized o in pes estic modity
licy truments, pply ntrol licies tput or input otas) and bsidies.
ach ese truments ve ntified al-world parture e
mon eoretical aracterization, ich has tentially ofound lications r
e aluation ach, d r e parison twe n em. t, al-world otas,
ether plied uts tputs, re pically t ansferable, d is s ry
rious lications r e cial sts pply ntrols. cond, llowing r e
adweight sts xation ance bsidies ans at subsidies olve ch
reater adweight ses, d ch avier rden xpayers, an nventional
alysis ld icate. dition, th bsidies d pply ntrols re costly
troduce, minister, d enforce. se sts, d e ffects oducer sponses
e entives eat, lso ange e adweight ses ach e licies,
eir i tributional nsequences, d eir fficiency s ans ansferring ome
oducers.
cond t ncerns lates e is-)repres ntation e arket ntext
ich licy plied. ten e licies alyzed ing realistic bina-
i ns ssumptions out pply d mand nditions d licy truments.
instance, often in the literature, policies that apply to individual commodities, or groups 
of commodities, are analyzed as though they apply to agriculture in aggregate; and elas- 
ticities that are relevant for agriculture as a whole are used as thought hey apply to 
individual commodities. One form of fallacy of composition is to conduct an analysis 
of U.S. agriculture that treats the entire industry as though it has the same policy as the 
wheat industry has; another is the use of a perfectly inelastic supply of land, as may be a 
good approximation for U.S. agriculture, in the analysis of the U.S. wheat price-support 
policy. There are few policy questions for which either of these approximations will be 
reasonable. Another common failing is the use of elasticities, especially for demand, that 
reflect a failure to account for the role of international trade. If the results are to be mean- 
ingful, we must match elasticities to both the length of run and the market of interest. 
As well as being intrinsically interesting, understanding the effects of policies is also 
a first step to understanding why certain policies are chosen, and toprescribing policies. 
While we have made considerable progress in theoretical models that help us think 
about hese issues, we have relatively little to show in terms of empirical understanding 
of incidence of farm commodity policies. More meaningful empirical analysis requires 
better measures of the conditions of supply of different factors of production in 
particular industries, taking into account he level of aggregation and length of run, 
better empirical estimates of the relevant commodity supply and demand elasticities, 
and more realistic representation of policy instruments. Important elements of the 
unfinished agenda for work in this area also include further theoretical development 
and empirical work on dynamic incidence of policy, policy risk, endogenous quality, the 
costs of administration and enforcement of policies, and the consequences of cheating. 
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